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FIDUCIARY GOVERNANCE
PAUL B. MILLER* & ANDREW S. GOLD**
ABSTRACT
The fiduciary relationship is one of the most fundamental legal
relationships, and its importance for both public and private law is
increasingly recognized. Fiduciary mandates typically involve one
person—the fiduciary—administering the affairs or property of other
persons—an individual beneficiary or group of beneficiaries. Yet, as
we will demonstrate, this is not the only way fiduciary relationships
are structured. Most accounts of fiduciary law oversimplify the law
because they exclude a categorically different form of fiduciary
relationship. A significant set of fiduciary relationships feature
governance mandates in which the fiduciary is charged with pur-
suing abstract purposes rather than the interests of persons. Indeed,
many public and private fiduciary institutions are best understood
as being administered on the basis of governance mandates, ren-
dering moot longstanding debates over specification of beneficiaries
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and requirements of loyalty. The resulting account provides impor-
tant new insights for core issues in corporate law, administrative
law, and constitutional law, among other fields.
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INTRODUCTION
Fiduciary theory is undergoing a renaissance. In recent years,
public law scholars have offered fiduciary accounts of the state and
its officials. Core features of corporate law have been explained in
fiduciary terms. Several important legal relationships—the parent-
child relationship, the lawyer-client relationship, and the doctor-
patient relationship—have been elaborated from a fiduciary
perspective. Yet, the nature of these fiduciary relationships is not
well understood. This Article offers a new perspective on an impor-
tant subset of fiduciary relationships.
Fiduciary mandates typically involve one person administering
the affairs or property of another. Fiduciary mandates of this sort
implicate a conventional fiduciary relationship to which the fi-
duciary and beneficiary are parties. In turn, the fiduciary’s role is
characterized by his or her possession of legal powers held relative
to practical interests of the beneficiary.1 Thus, for example, an agent
is authorized to exercise certain powers to bind her principal in
contract, and is understood as exercising her powers to advance the
interests of the principal (for example, interests in a business
venture). Similarly, a lawyer is authorized to represent her client
and, in exercising particular powers of representation, acts to
protect or pursue the interests of her client (for example, interests
in a child custody matter or criminal prosecution). In these contexts,
fiduciary mandates exist for the benefit of determinate persons.
Given that fiduciary mandates of this sort involve fiduciaries
serving the interests of persons, we shall refer to them as fiduciary
service mandates. 
Most accounts of fiduciary law assume that all fiduciary relation-
ships are strictly interpersonal. For example, Tamar Frankel has
argued that fiduciary relationships are a primary form of social
relationship marked by interpersonal dependency: “[O]ne party to
a fiduciary relation (the entrustor) is dependent on the other (the
fiduciary).... [T]he entrustor becomes dependent because he must
1. Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW 63, 69-72 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) [hereinafter Miller,
The Fiduciary Relationship].
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rely on the fiduciary for a particular service.”2 Gordon Smith has
said that fiduciary relationships involve the fiduciary acting on be-
half of a beneficiary in respect of a critical resource belonging to the
beneficiary.3 And Deborah DeMott has suggested that fiduciary
duties be understood interpersonally in terms of an overarching ob-
ligation “to act to further the beneficiary’s best interests.”4 Indeed,
one of us has argued that fiduciary liability is premised upon the
existence of a fiduciary relationship defined in interpersonal terms.5
Moreover, these analyses are supported by sweeping judicial state-
ments.6
These accounts are not unreasonable. The difficulty is that they
oversimplify the law. A significant subset of fiduciary mandates
involves governance rather than service. Fiduciary governance
mandates arise in contexts in which the fiduciary is engaged to
determine or advance certain abstract purposes. Whereas service
mandates involve administration of the affairs or property of per-
sons, governance mandates involve administration for particular
purposes. The powers of the fiduciary, and the objects for which he
acts, are specifiable entirely with reference to one or more abstract
2. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 800 (1983) (emphasis omitted).
3. D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1399, 1402 (2002).
4. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, DUKE L.J.
879, 882 (1988).
5. See Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 1, at 69; Paul B. Miller, Justifying
Fiduciary Duties, 58 MCGILL L.J. 969, 1009-15 (2013) [hereinafter Miller, Justifying Fiduciary
Duties].
6. See, e.g., Dunn v. Dunn, 786 So. 2d 1045, 1053 (Miss. 2001) (“In determining whether
a fiduciary relationship exists, we have to look to see if one person depends upon another.”
(citing In re Will & Estate of Varvaris, 477 So. 2d 273, 278 (Miss. 1985))); Chmieleski v. City
Prods. Corp., 660 S.W.2d 275, 294 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (“[There are] certain basic elements
necessary to the establishment of a fiduciary relationship .... [T]hese are: (1) as between the
parties, one must be subservient to the dominant mind and will of the other as a result of age,
state of health, illiteracy, mental disability, or ignorance; (2) things of value such as land,
monies, a business, or other things of value which are the property of the subservient person
must be possessed or managed by the dominant party; (3) there must be a surrender of
independence by the subservient party to the dominant party; (4) there must be an automatic
or habitual manipulation of the actions of the subservient party by the dominant party; and
(5) there must be a showing that the subservient party places a trust and confidence in the
dominant party.”); Penato v. George, 383 N.Y.S.2d 900, 904 (App. Div. 1976) (“[A] fiduciary
relationship is one founded upon trust or confidence reposed by one person in the integrity
and fidelity of another.”).
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purposes without it being necessary to identify a beneficiary, much
less the particular interests or preferences of that beneficiary.
Fiduciary governance has striking implications for broad swaths
of law, from corporate and charities law to administrative and con-
stitutional law. Fiduciary theory has recently shed new light on
these fields. Yet difficult and unresolved questions remain under the
conventional view. For example, a longstanding debate exists in cor-
porate law on the question of which groups are properly identified
as the beneficiaries of the fiduciary administration of corporations
by directors. Administrative law, for its part, raises difficult ques-
tions concerning the proper beneficiaries of agency discretion. And
legal and political theorists who have advanced fiduciary theories
of government have struggled with the problem of identifying
beneficiaries of public offices and undertakings. To a considerable
extent, these problems can be traced to assumptions implicit in
conventional accounts of fiduciary law. Recasting the mandates in
these settings in terms of fiduciary governance offers a fresh per-
spective on these debates.
In this Article, we explain the idea of fiduciary governance and
distinguish it from fiduciary service. Our analysis unfolds as
follows. In Part I, we examine the differences between fiduciary
service and fiduciary governance mandates and discuss three
exemplars of fiduciary governance: the administration of charitable
purpose trusts; the administration of state-owned public purpose
corporations; and the administration of conventional corporations.7
In Part II, we explain the sense in which fiduciary governance
mandates are situated within a distinctive kind of fiduciary
relationship, and we explore the ramifications of fiduciary gover-
nance for our understanding of the structure of fiduciary liability.
In Part III, we discuss fiduciary governance in the context of the
hallmark fiduciary obligation of loyalty, contrasting the familiar
ways in which fiduciaries exhibit loyalty to persons with the notion
of loyalty to purposes that constrains execution of fiduciary gover-
nance mandates. In Part IV, we highlight some of the more
important implications of our account of fiduciary governance.
7. We refer to public purposes rather than benefits to distinguish these state-established
and -controlled corporations from privately owned public benefit corporations.
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The most significant implication of our discussion is that several
key private and public institutions ordinarily theorized in terms of
fiduciary service would be better understood as implicating fiduciary
governance. For example, the state and its public offices and offi-
cials arguably have fiduciary governance mandates and, as such, a
distinctive set of fiduciary responsibilities. Likewise, in corporate
law settings, corporate directors may have fiduciary governance
mandates. This view of the mandates of directors allows us to better
understand what is at stake in cases like Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., in which corporate management sees its role in terms
of given—and sometimes quite distinctive—corporate purposes.8 In
these and other settings, the idea of fiduciary governance suggests
a fundamental rethinking of the nature of fiduciary mandates.
I. THE NATURE OF FIDUCIARY GOVERNANCE
Conventional fiduciary relationships are formed between fidu-
ciaries and beneficiaries, and found an interpersonal form of ac-
countability, realized through assignment of correlative rights and
duties between the parties. We have suggested, however, that
fiduciary law also admits of governance-type fiduciary mandates
that are regulated by institutional accountability mechanisms. In
what follows, we explain fiduciary governance and offer three illus-
trations to establish correspondence between our theory and actual
practices of fiduciary administration. In order to establish the dis-
tinctiveness of fiduciary governance, we begin by offering a brief
account of fiduciary service. 
A. Fiduciary Service Mandates
Most fiduciaries are engaged in the provision of fiduciary services
for or on behalf of a beneficiary or group of beneficiaries.9 The ser-
vices provided are varied but necessarily refer to a beneficiary in
that they directly engage one or more of their specific practical
8. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
9. For the sake of convenience, we will henceforth refer by default to beneficiaries in the
singular sense, though what we say holds equally true of mandates held for the benefit of mul-
tiple beneficiaries.
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interests.10 As we will explain in Part II, fiduciaries always occupy
a position of authority under which they exercise one or more legal
powers granted on a fiduciary basis. Under fiduciary service man-
dates, the beneficiary11—or a benefactor who wishes to make a
mediated benefaction to the beneficiary—authorizes the fiduciary
to act.12 In either event, service mandates entail the fiduciary
exercising powers relative to the person or property of the benefi-
ciary, for the benefit of the beneficiary.
The fiduciary, if she performs well, will materially advance or
protect those practical interests of the beneficiary that ground her
mandate. For example, a fiduciary acting under a service mandate
may ensure that the beneficiary’s physical health is protected or
that his money is wisely invested. Sometimes fiduciaries are re-
tained because the beneficiary or benefactor is incapable of at-
tending to the affairs subject to the mandate.13 But more often,
fiduciaries are retained so that individuals may invest their
personal energies in pursuits that they feel better qualified to un-
dertake or that they value more.14 
In speaking of fiduciary service, we do not mean to imply that
provision of services in the colloquial sense is always or even
10. Practical interests are interests held by persons in respect of their own person, their
property, or their relationships with others. See Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, supra
note 1, at 73.
11. For example, a lawyer is ordinarily authorized to act for his client by his client as
beneficiary; similarly, an agent is customarily granted agency powers by her principal as
beneficiary.
12. For example, a trustee acting under an ordinary private donative trust is authorized
to act under a trust deed executed by a settlor as benefactor in the context of him settling
property on trust for the benefit of named beneficiaries.
13. Avihay Dorfman suggests that many trusts can be understood in this way. Avihay
Dorfman, On Trust and Transubstantiation: Mitigating the Excesses of Ownership, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 339, 350-54.
14. Hanoch Dagan & Sharon Hannes, Managing Our Money: The Law of Financial
Fiduciaries as a Private Law Institution, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW,
supra note 1, at 91, 92 (arguing that, in the context of financial fiduciary management,
“enabling the safe delegation of management of our money is autonomy enhancing because
it allows people to enlist others for this increasingly complex task and focus their time and
attention on their intrinsically valuable projects”); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 426 (1993) (suggesting that
people hire fiduciaries for the efficiencies generated by specialization and expertise); Frankel,
supra note 2, at 803 (discussing the increasing prevalence and social importance of fiduciary
relationships in the context of trends toward heightened labor specialization and profes-
sionalization of knowledge).
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ordinarily fiduciary, much less that all fiduciaries in conventional
fiduciary relationships are engaged in the provision of services so
understood.15 Some fiduciaries are, of course, professional service
providers, such as lawyers and doctors. But we have in mind a more
technical conception of service. By “fiduciary service,” we mean to
refer to the exercise of fiduciary powers in service of the interests of
a determinate person or group of persons.16 Fiduciary service man-
dates thus involve one person (the fiduciary) acting in service of
another person (the beneficiary). Fiduciary service mandates are, on
our account, so intimately connected with the service of persons that
these mandates cannot be held absent the existence of an identifi-
able beneficiary. A lawyer-client relationship, for instance, is one in
which the lawyer provides specialized fiduciary services for the
benefit of the client. Provision of these services is contingent upon
the lawyer having been authorized to act for a client. Absent an
actual client, the lawyer has no mandate, and no relationship exists
within which a mandate could be carried out.
Under our account, a fiduciary mandate has a beneficiary if, and
only if, an identifiable person or group of persons exists for whose
benefit the mandate is granted and executed.17 A beneficiary in this
sense is not simply a person with a contingent expectation of a pos-
sible but undefined and undesignated benefit from a mandate. It is
instead a person whose personal, practical interests in the mandate
are ascertainable ex ante and whose interests are protected through
personal enjoyment of rights or powers relative to the mandate.
Again, all fiduciary mandates have beneficiaries in the broad sense
that persons do, or may, reasonably expect to benefit from their
execution. Service mandates differ from governance mandates in
that the mandate itself is necessarily defined and constituted in
15. This understanding is contrary to the suggestion of some that many service providers,
including mechanics, electricians, plumbers, and other tradespeople, should be considered fi-
duciaries. See Robert Flannigan, Fiduciary Mechanics, 14 CAN. LAB. & EMP. L.J. 25, 25 (2008).
16. For example, a lawyer representing her client in a civil or criminal proceeding, or a
partner acting on behalf of his fellow partners in partnership business, acts in service of
determinate persons.
17. This coheres with a broader view which suggests that beneficiaries are ascertained
persons enjoying designated benefits under law. Beneficiary, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 149
(10th ed. 2014) (defining a beneficiary as: “A person who is designated to benefit from an
appointment, disposition, or assignment (as in a will, insurance policy, etc.); one designated
to receive something as a result of a legal arrangement or instrument”).
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terms of specific beneficiaries and their ascertained or ascertainable
interests.
The general characteristics of fiduciary service mandates might
be best revealed by illustration. Consider two kinds of conventional
fiduciary relationships: the first between the trustee and beneficiary
of an ordinary donative trust, and the second between parents and
their children.
The settlor’s settlement of property on trust for the benefit of the
beneficiary establishes the relationship between the trustee and
beneficiary of an ordinary donative trust.18 One indication of the fact
that these trusts entail a service-type mandate is found in a basic
principle of trust law—the beneficiary principle. Under this prin-
ciple, a trust which was evidently settled for the benefit of persons
will be deemed invalid if there are no ascertainable beneficiaries.19
Similarly, an existing trust validly settled for the benefit of persons
will be wound up if all such persons die or refuse to take the benefi-
cial interest in the trust.20 In the context of ordinary donative trusts,
the trust necessarily implicates the existence of a beneficiary be-
cause a proper construction of the intention of the settlor is that she
wished the trust property to be administered for the benefit of
specific persons.21
Let us now consider parents and children. Parents are fiduciaries
in many jurisdictions. Unlike most conventional fiduciary rela-
tionships, the nature of the parents’ fiduciary mandate cannot be
18. JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 385 (9th ed.
2013) (“A trust is ... a legal arrangement created by a settlor in which a trustee holds property
as a fiduciary for one or more beneficiaries.”) (emphasis omitted).
19. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(a)(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); see also DUKEMINIER &
SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 417 (“A private trust must have one or more ascertainable
beneficiaries to whom the trustee owes fiduciary duties and who can call the trustee to
account. This rule ... follows from the more fundamental principle that a private trust must
be for the benefit of the beneficiaries.”); GRAHAM VIRGO, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY & TRUSTS
115 (2012) (“[A]n express trust for persons must have identifiable people in whose favour the
court can decree performance.... A logical consequence of recognizing the beneficiary principle
is that an express trust must be a trust for persons.”) (footnote omitted).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 44 (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“A trust is not created,
or if created will not continue, unless the terms of the trust provide a beneficiary who is
ascertainable at the time or who may later become ascertainable within the period and terms
of the rule against perpetuities.”) (emphasis added).
21. Id. § 46 (“[W]here the owner of property transfers it upon intended trust for the
members of an indefinite class of persons, no trust is created.”).
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readily implied from the circumstances surrounding the establish-
ment of the relationship. Parental authority is a sui generis form of
fiduciary authority recognized by law.22 However, parental authority
is evidently not held for the benefit of parents.23 Instead, it is im-
pliedly undertaken for the benefit of the person of the child. This is
reflected in the foundational family law principle that the actions of
parents and guardians are to be evaluated in light of the best in-
terests of the child.24 As is true of other conventional fiduciary rela-
tionships, it is impossible to conceive of parental fiduciary authority
absent an actual, identifiable person for whose benefit fiduciary
authority and powers exist. One is not a parent in any sense, and
certainly not in a legal sense, absent a child to whom one stands as
a parent. 
B. The Nature of Fiduciary Governance
Many, perhaps most, fiduciary mandates are service mandates.
However, others entail fiduciary administration for purposes
rather than persons. These are governance mandates. All fiduciary
mandates imply purposes inasmuch as the fiduciary’s discretion is
to be oriented to the achievement of certain objectives. However,
purposes are distinctive in governance mandates insofar as they are
not identified with determinate persons and their practical inter-
ests; they are, in this sense, abstract. The purposes that underlie
22. See EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY 44 (2011)
(“To establish the necessary connection between parent and child, Kant points to the act of
procreation, an act that brings a helpless and vulnerable child into the world without the
child’s consent. Procreation is the interactional trigger that gives rise to the parents’ obliga-
tion.”); see also Paul B. Miller, Principles of Public Fiduciary Administration, in BOUNDARIES
OF STATE, BOUNDARIES OF RIGHTS: HUMAN RIGHTS, PRIVATE ACTORS, AND POSITIVE
OBLIGATIONS (Anat Scolnicov & Tsvi Kahana eds., forthcoming 2016).
23. See generally Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2401, 2401-02 (1995).
24. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 224 (1996); Philip Alston, The Best Interests Principle: Towards
a Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights, 8 INT’L J.L. & FAM. 1, 3 (1994); Julie E. Artis,
Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges’ Accounts of the Tender Years Doctrine, 38 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 769, 774 (2004); Erwin Chemerinsky, Defining the “Best Interests”: Consti-
tutional Protections in Involuntary Adoptions, 18 J. FAM. L. 79, 80-81 (1979); Carl E.
Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA’s Best-Interest
Standard, 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215, 2216 (1991).
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fiduciary governance mandates reflect goals or commitments de-
fined in relation to groups, associations, or communities and are so
tied to the interests of the group, community, or association that the
interests of individuals cannot be disaggregated from those of the
collectivity without undermining either the collectivity or the integ-
rity of the purpose(s) posited for it.25 
Recognizing that governance mandates are held relative to collec-
tivities makes it important to know how stipulated purposes figure
in the identity and functioning of collectivities. Though we cannot
deal with this issue exhaustively here, we note that the purposes
underlying a governance mandate are often constitutive of the
collectivity in respect of its identity and functioning.26 In some cases,
the collectivity is so determinate that we can say with reasonable
confidence that we know what demographic, community, associa-
tion, or other site of collective interest is intended to benefit from a
governance mandate, as in a trust established to provide medical or
dental care for the benefit of a specific Native American commun-
ity.27 The collectivity in these cases subsists independently of the
governance mandate established for it. In other cases, however, the
purpose(s) might be framed in terms of the general public interest
or in terms of general characteristics of persons that apply widely
(for example, income level, educational background, etc.), such that
little can be said of those intended to benefit other than that they
actually or potentially fall within the scope of the mandate. In still
other cases, a governance mandate is instrumental in bringing a
well-defined collectivity into existence; the mandate, and a legal
form of association with which it is connected, make organization of
that kind possible, such as benefit corporations or workers’ coopera-
tives. 
25. This is consistent with the recognition that in law, if not in morality, collectivities can
have interests, rights, and powers, not to mention personality and legal capacity, independent
of those of their members. On the nature of collective interests, and the notion that collective
interests may be a basis for recognition of collective rights, see Leslie Green, Two Views of
Collective Rights, 4 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 315, 320-24 (1991), and Dwight G. Newman, Collective
Interests and Collective Rights, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 127, 129 (2004).
26. Carol C. Gould, Group Rights and Social Ontology, in CHALLENGES TO LAW AT THE END
OF THE 20TH CENTURY: RIGHTS 56, 57 (Rex Martin & Gerhard Sprenger eds., 1997) (“Groups
are defined by ... joint activity or common purposes (whether explicitly recognized or not).”).
27. See, e.g., Caryn Trombino, Note, Changing the Borders of the Federal Trust Obligation:
The Urban Indian Health Care Crisis, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 129, 146-52 (2005).
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Given the importance of fiduciary governance to social coopera-
tion and coordination, and given the fundamental value of freedom
of association, it should be unsurprising that the law takes a liberal
approach to the specification of purposes for governance mandates.
A governance mandate can be established for any of a number of
private or public purposes, and the purposes in question can be
posited by an individual acting in a private or official capacity, or by
a group of individuals acting likewise as private persons or members
of a public body. Purposes specified may be charitable, as when an
individual establishes a charitable purpose trust or corporation for
objects of public benefit.28 They may also be private economic or
commercial purposes, as is true of the fiduciary administration of
unions, pension funds, commercial trusts, and business corpora-
tions. Purposes specified for a governance mandate may reflect
interests in forms of common property (for example, homeowners’
associations in cooperatives), or personal or community interests
(for example, the incorporation of a leisure club). Individuals may
also establish a governance mandate for purely public purposes
relating to some aspect of general public welfare. While specification
of purposes for governance mandates is largely subject to the
discretion of the person or persons establishing them, the purposes
in question must be legal, within the authority of those who have
purported to establish the mandate, and tolerably clear. 
One important indication of the dependence of governance man-
dates on clearly stipulated abstract purposes, and of their independ-
ence from persons with standing as beneficiaries, is found in their
persistence over time despite changes in the membership of collec-
tivities with which they are associated. The subsistence of a service
mandate, by contrast, usually turns on the existence and continuing
voluntary participation of specific persons as parties to the man-
date. The fact that service mandates ordinarily depend on the
ongoing involvement of specific persons suggests that conventional
fiduciary relationships involve a form of privity, not unlike contrac-
tual relationships.29
28. See infra Part I.C.1-2.
29. The fact that fiduciary relationships imply privity is also reflected in courts’ refusal
to countenance the idea that legal obligations owed by fiduciaries under service-type man-
dates extend to persons other than identified beneficiaries. For example, courts have held that
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Fiduciary governance is different. The relationships through
which governance mandates are carried out are not constrained by
an expectation of privity. Instead, these relationships are main-
tained through legal offices.30 A fiduciary office must be occupied by
someone, but may be occupied by anyone with stipulated qualifica-
tions, pursuant to whatever process is established for the ap-
pointment or election of the officeholder. A particular governance
mandate might, depending on available resources and the viability
of its objects, persist for centuries and undergo regular change in
the identities of occupants of attached offices.31 
Given that governance mandates are institutional, it also merits
notice that fiduciary governance has an important, if complex and
contingent, relationship with concepts and practices of representa-
tion.32 As we will explain in Part II, all fiduciaries represent others
in the sense that their powers are derived from the legal personality
the duty of care that a lawyer owes her client does not extend to third parties. See Robert W.
Tuttle, The Fiduciary’s Fiduciary: Legal Ethics in Fiduciary Representation, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 889, 903.
30. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 75-76 (2011) (describing characteristics of offices by
using the office of President of the United States as an illustration: “The presidency of the
United States is an office. It endures from term to term and its normative character does not
change merely because one president vacates and a new inhabitant assumes power. Presi-
dents come and go but the presidency remains. Because the office of the president is continu-
ous over time, each new inhabitant immediately assumes the power conferred on him or her
by the office”). Offices are especially important to the administration of personified entities
such as corporations. See Dick W.P. Ruiter, Types of Institutions as Patterns of Regulated Be-
haviour, 10 RES PUBLICA 207, 220 (2004) (“A legal person can be conceived of as having a will
that must be expressed by a decision-maker. This means that ... decision-makers of legal
persons are considered to express an objective will on the basis of individual decision-making
capacities. The next step is to personify such individual decision-making capacities, thereby
turning them into permanent organs of legal persons termed ‘offices.’”).
31. For example, consider a few of the more venerable American companies, such as Cigna
(1792), Jim Beam (1795), JP Morgan Chase (1799), and DuPont (1802). See Diane Bullock,
America’s 10 Oldest Public Companies, MINYANVILLE (Sept. 23, 2011, 12:30 PM), http://www.
minyanville.com/special-features/articles/oldest-public-companies-america2527s-oldest-
companies/9/23/2011/id/37022 [http://perma.cc/84RM-FJNW]. Additionally, consider some only
slightly less venerable charitable organizations, including Kamehameha Schools (1887), the
Rockefeller Foundation (1913), the Kresge Foundation (1924), and the Ford Foundation
(1936). See List of Wealthiest Charitable Foundations, PROJECT GUTENBERG, http://self.
gutenberg.org/articles/list_of_wealthiest_charitable_foundations [http://perma.cc/6A7V-2EM4]
(last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
32. On legal and political representation in general, see Ronald Rogowski, Representation
in Political Theory and in Law, 91 ETHICS 395 (1981), and David Runciman, The Paradox of
Political Representation, 15 J. POL. PHIL. 93 (2007).
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of other persons. Fiduciaries undertaking a governance mandate
serve as representatives in this sense, inasmuch as they act on
derived powers devoted to the benefit of collectivities. But any claim
they might have to being representatives of a collectivity depends on
the nature of their authority.33
Some governance mandates are created by a person or personified
entity for the benefit of a collectivity. In these cases, the fiduciary is
authorized to act in ways that will benefit members of the collectivi-
ty, but the fiduciary has no authority to make decisions for members
by virtue of their identification with the group.34 Instead, the fidu-
ciary acts on authority traceable to that enjoyed by the benefactor
who established the mandate for the benefit of the collectivity. In
these cases, if the fiduciary is a representative of anyone, he is a
representative of the benefactor. However, other fiduciaries are rep-
resentatives of collectivities either because the collectivity is a
personified legal entity or because its members have associated
themselves through a governance mandate. In either case, the fidu-
ciary is a representative in the classical sense, and his mandate
must be considered a constitutive element of the association of peo-
ple for common purposes. The fiduciary is critical to the collectivity
achieving its purpose(s) inasmuch as his mandate enables coordina-
tion of effort and investment in the association through centralized
decision making.
33. In the sense that they represent or personate those for whom they act as represen-
tatives. See Runciman, supra note 32, at 94 (“[P]ersons and things are granted a kind of
artificial presence by the act of representation.”).
34. The authority to make decisions for a collectivity entails the authority to represent but
does not resolve the core normative dilemma respecting the manner in which representation
ought to occur. The dilemma is framed chiefly in terms of whether political authorities in dem-
ocratic government ought to govern on the basis of the manifest preferences of those for whom
they govern or instead on the basis of their independent judgment about what would best
serve their interests. See generally HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESEN-
TATION (1967). This debate has played out in terms of divergent perspectives on the nature
and content of norms governing political representatives. Tellingly, many of these norms have
a decidedly fiduciary flavor. See, e.g., Alexander A. Guerrero, The Paradox of Voting and the
Ethics of Political Representation, 38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 272, 281 (2010) (“[T]he correct picture
is one on which representatives face multiple competing norms regarding how they ought to
behave: norms of fidelity (doing as they said they would), norms of deference (doing as their
constituents would presently prefer), norms of guardianship (doing as would be best for their
constituents), and moral norms of a more general sort.”).
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C. Fiduciary Governance in Practice 
Given that fiduciary law scholars are most accustomed to think-
ing of conventional, service-type fiduciary mandates, we will briefly
discuss three examples of governance-type mandates. We offer these
illustrations simply to demonstrate that fiduciary governance is a
real and distinctive form of fiduciary administration. We believe
that fiduciary governance marks the primary point at which prin-
ciples of private fiduciary administration mesh with those of public
fiduciary administration. For that reason, we will discuss examples
of both private and public fiduciary governance. Our clearest private
law exemplar is the charitable purpose trust. Our public law model
is the public purpose corporation. We will then show how similar
structures are evident in a leading theory of conventional corporate
laws.
1. Charitable Purpose Trusts
Private charitable purpose trusts are a widely recognized kind of
express trust.35 They are distinguished from both noncharitable pur-
pose trusts that are permitted in some jurisdictions but subject to
extensive limitations,36 and ordinary donative trusts in which a
settlor acts charitably but with an intention to benefit specified
persons.37
Charitable purpose trusts clearly entail a governance mandate.
The trustee is obliged to administer the trust to advance the
charitable purposes specified for the trust; trusts of this sort are
distinguished from ordinary donative trusts precisely on the basis
that they lack beneficiaries.38 As is true of other governance man-
dates, charitable purpose trusts are, of course, intended to benefit
35. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
36. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 751.
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 15 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
38. Maitland clearly recognized that a trust may be established for purposes as well as
for persons in defining it, thus: “I should define a trust in some such way as the follow-
ing—When a person has rights which he is bound to exercise upon behalf of another or for the
accomplishment of some particular purpose he is said to have those rights in trust for that
other or for that purpose and he is called a trustee.” F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY 44 (A.H. Chaytor
& W.J. Whittaker eds., 2d ed., rev. 1936).
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people. But the promise of benefit is contingent in respect of the
eventual recipients. Those who ultimately benefit from achievement
of the purposes of the trust have no claim right (or any other legally
enforceable expectation, for that matter) to benefit from the trust.
Indeed, if such a trust is found to have been intended to benefit
specific persons, the trust will fail.39 
The law on the validity and administration of charitable purpose
trusts reflects a preoccupation with specification of, and adherence
to, purposes. In terms of specification, the first requirement is that
the trust has been established to advance a purpose rather than to
benefit specific persons.40 The second is that the purpose be of the
right sort; namely, that it be genuinely charitable.41 Adherence to
specified purposes is also a primary concern of the courts in review-
ing the conduct of trustees. Accordingly, enforcement rights and
powers are held not by persons asserting privileged standing in
connection with personal claim rights, but instead by parties that
have an interest in enforcing charitable purposes for the public ben-
efit, such as attorneys general or state agencies with regulatory
authority over charitable organizations.42 
39. See Shenandoah Valley Nat’l Bank v. Taylor, 63 S.E.2d 786, 789 (Va. 1951) (“In the
law of trusts there is a real and fundamental distinction between a charitable trust and one
that is devoted to mere benevolence. The former is public in nature and valid; the latter is
private and if it offends the rule against perpetuities, it is void.”).
40. Id. (“It is essential that a charity be for the benefit of an indefinite number of
persons.”).
41. The law zealously enforces the requirement of charity. It does so through a set of
restrictions going to the definition of purposes in the trust; notably, purposes must be
charitable in the sense of being of public benefit, and the purposes must be exclusively
charitable. See id.; see also Statute of Charitable Uses 1601, 43 Eliz. c. 4 (Eng.); UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 405(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (AM. LAW
INST. 2003).
42. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 743 (“[B]ecause a charitable trust does not
require an ascertainable beneficiary, traditional law relies on the state attorney general to
enforce the trust.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (AM. LAW INST. 1959)
(“A suit can be maintained for the enforcement of a charitable trust by the Attorney General
or other public officer, or by a co-trustee, or by a person who has a special interest in the
enforcement of the charitable trust, but not by persons who have no special interest or by the
settlor or his heirs, personal representatives or next of kin.”). Trust law in many states has
since witnessed modification of rules on standing such that the settlor and those acting in his
stead can now sue to enforce the trust. See Smithers v. St. Luke’s-Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723
N.Y.S.2d 426, 434 (App. Div. 2001) (“The donor of a charitable gift is in a better position than
the Attorney General to be vigilant and, if he or she is so inclined, to enforce his or her own
intent.”); UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
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Unlike other varieties of governance mandate, the institutional
character of the charitable purpose trust is not obvious, partly be-
cause these trusts often lack a formal default organizational struc-
ture. Trusts are often considered simply as a transactional device;
more specifically, as a kind of benefaction serving the donative
purposes of an individual person.43 Allowing that most ordinary
donative trusts are interpersonal in nature, the charitable purpose
trust evidences its institutional character through the realization of
its purposes over extended periods of time.44 Charitable purpose
trusts can persist for centuries. Indeed, according to Graham Virgo,
the oldest charitable purpose trust in England established the
King’s School in Canterbury 1500 years ago.45
These trusts—and, by extension, fiduciary administration for the
purposes for which they were established—persist despite fluctua-
tion in their constituencies. This amply demonstrates the inde-
pendence of fiduciary administration from the identity of persons
that may be implicated in a governance mandate. However, the
corollary of this is a dependence on viable purposes to be pursued by
the fiduciary. The law relating to the termination of trusts for want
of a viable purpose reflects the latter point,46 as does the law
relating to the substitution of nonviable for viable purposes under
the cy pres doctrine.47
TRUSTS § 94(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2012).
43. But leading trust law scholars recognize that part of the enduring value of the trust
lies in its adaptability to widely divergent purposes. See AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT ET AL.,
SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 1.1 (4th ed. 2006) (“The purposes for which we can create
trusts are as unlimited as our imagination.”).
44. Unlike trusts for persons, trusts for charitable purposes are exempt from the temporal
limitation on the term of trusts imposed by the rule against perpetuities. See DUKEMINIER &
SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 743.
45. VIRGO, supra note 19, at 166-67.
46. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 752 (“A nineteenth-century trust to care
for old horses retired from pulling fire wagons and streetcars could not be administered for
those purposes in the twentieth century.”).
47. Id. (“Under the cy pres doctrine, if a charitable trust’s specific purpose becomes illegal,
impossible, or impracticable, the court may direct the application of the trust property to an-
other charitable purpose that approximates the settlor’s general charitable intent.”). Note that
the cy pres doctrine now operates on the basis of a presumption of general charitable intent.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
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2. Public Purpose Corporations
The charitable purpose trust provides a clear illustration of fidu-
ciary governance in private law; the public purpose corporation is an
equally vivid example of fiduciary governance drawn from public
law.48 
The “public purpose corporation” is not a legal term of art, and
common synonyms—special act corporation, statutory corporation,
special purpose corporation, government corporation, or state-owned
enterprise—are only imperfectly synonymous and no less ambigu-
ous.49 Many different kinds of corporation may be referred to as
public purpose corporations.50 Conceived broadly, they include cor-
porations established by private persons for mixed commercial and
charitable or other social purposes, those established by private
persons for charitable purposes, and those established by the state
primarily for a public purpose.51 In this Article we use “public
purpose corporation” to refer only to the latter kind of entity. Given
48. We acknowledge, of course, that private investment in public purpose corporations and
the involvement of public purpose corporations in private markets—not to mention privatiza-
tion of public functions through conditional delegation of public functions to private corpora-
tions—problematizes efforts to distinguish “private” and “public.” See generally Jody Freeman,
Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003); Jody
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000) [hereinafter
Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance]; Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as
Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101
GEO. L.J. 1023 (2013); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Bureaucracy at the Boundary, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 841 (2014).
49. See Oliver Peter Field, Government Corporations: A Proposal, 48 HARV. L. REV. 775,
780 (1935) (“It seems clear that no analysis of the forms and controls and functions and es-
sential elements of power will furnish any very satisfactory clue to just what is a government
corporation or to the type of institution that should be called a government-owned corpora-
tion.”); see also O’Connell, supra note 48, at 856 (“There is no established definition of a
government corporation in federal law.”).
50. See, e.g., Field, supra note 49; O.R. McGuire, Government by Corporations, 14 VA. L.
REV. 182 (1928); Robert H. Schnell, Federally Owned Corporations and Their Legal Problems,
14 N.C. L. REV. 238 (1936); John Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations—I, 21 VA.
L. REV. 351 (1935); John Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporations—II, 21 VA. L. REV.
465 (1935).
51. See O’Connell, supra note 48, at 856. Another category of potential interest is the
otherwise private corporation in which the State acquires significant shareholdings. For a
helpful discussion, see Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80
FORDHAM L. REV. 2917 (2012).
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that public purpose corporations will be unfamiliar to many, we of-
fer the following additional explanatory remarks.52 
Public purpose corporations include all entities incorporated pri-
marily for a public purpose by a federal or state government. Thus,
public purpose corporations are engaged in widely different kinds of
activities.53 Some undertake commercial activities in sectors of the
economy that are state-controlled or regulated because they impli-
cate essential public goods. Others administer state-supported
benefit or development programs. Still others are effectively state
agencies exercising regulatory powers on behalf of the state. 
Public purpose corporations also vary widely in respect of their
purposes. Some pursue mixed commercial and public policy
objectives (for example, government-controlled corporations granted
a monopoly over provision of certain goods or services—such as
postal services, alcohol sales, or the supply of public utilities).54
Others pursue specific economic or social policy objectives (for
example, corporations engaged in provision of insurance and other
financial services, such as the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and various economic devel-
opment corporations).55 Still others pursue a mixture of policy and
regulatory purposes. In addition, public purpose corporations differ
in respect of their legal and operational autonomy.56 Some are dom-
inated by the state, such as those for which directors are appointed
by the state as well as those for which decisions require regular
consultation with, or approval from, government officials. Others
enjoy significant autonomy.57 
52. For a detailed history of government corporations in the United States, see Lebron v.
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 386-91 (1995).
53. See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Reinventing the Government Corporation, 1995
U. ILL. L. REV. 543, 553-57.
54. See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 48, at 843-45.
55. See, e.g., Pargendler, supra note 51, at 2926.
56. See Kimberly N. Brown, Government by Contract and the Structural Constitution, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491, 510 (2011) (observing that public purpose corporations and other
“quasi-government entities” are “characterized by varying degrees of executive branch control
and accountability”); see also GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REFERENCE MANUAL OF GOVERNMENT
CORPORATIONS, S. DOC. NO. 79-86, at x-xi (1945).
57. Froomkin, supra note 53, at 558 (“Like independent agencies, FGCs [Federal Govern-
ment Corporations] allow Congress to insulate a program from the cabinet department that
would normally have jurisdiction over it.”).
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Finally, public purpose corporations differ in terms of allowance
made for private investment in the corporation and free market
interaction with the corporation. Some public purpose corporations,
for example, accept private investment (such as by selling bonds or
engaging in joint private-public partnerships), while others do not.58
Furthermore, while some public purpose corporations participate in
private markets, others do not directly engage in markets. And, in
certain circumstances, the state has excluded private investment in,
and ownership of, formerly private corporations by nationalizing
them.59 
However constituted, all public purpose corporations are adminis-
tered to advance purposes rather than to promote the interests of
determinate persons. For many public purpose corporations, there
is little sense in talking of beneficiaries even in a broad sense be-
cause the ends and activities of the corporation are not referable to
a particular segment of the general population, much less to a
determinate person or set of persons. Of course, all public purpose
corporations are administered for the benefit of the public—and so
in the public interest60—but that does not mean that there are
ascertained or ascertainable beneficiaries of the corporation.
To say that a corporation carries on its affairs for the benefit of
the public is simply to say that everyone in general, but no one in
particular, has a reasonable expectation of benefitting from the ad-
vancement of its purposes.61 In other words, the “beneficial interest”
of the public is inextricable from the public purpose specified for the
58. Id. at 554 (“Many, but by no means all, FGCs issue stock, some or all of which is
owned by legal or natural private (nongovernmental) persons.”); see also, e.g., Susan H. Free-
man & Elizabeth A. Inadomi, Who’s the Captain Kirk of this Enterprise?: Regulating Outer
Space Industry Through Corporate Structures, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 795, 812-16 (1985)
(describing experience with the Communications Satellite Corporation, or Comsat, and illus-
trating the value of utilizing public purpose corporations as vehicles through which to encour-
age—yet control—private investment in common resources such as outer space).
59. Usually during periods of national emergency such as war time, or in respect of a pres-
sing issue of national priority (for example, the development or improvement of railways,
highways, and waterways). See Field, supra note 49, at 776-77.
60. See McGuire, supra note 50, at 182 (“[T]here is a tendency, having its roots in the
World War, to organize Federal-owned corporations to discharge governmental functions
which the legislative and executive branches deem necessary or desirable in the public inter-
ests.”).
61. For the sake of clarity, we exclude from consideration public purpose corporations in
which private persons are permitted to own, and do own, stock.
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corporation, such that the interests of the public in the sound
execution of the mandate are strictly tied to the achievement of the
purpose(s) through which the mandate is defined. If members of the
public feel that their interests are not reflected well in those pur-
poses, their complaint lies with the state and its officials, rather
than with corporate fiduciaries.62
The import of purposes in defining the mission and fiduciary
mandates of public purpose corporations is reflected in legislative
“purpose clauses” that specify the particular public purpose(s) to be
advanced by a given corporation. Even though, in some cases, these
purposes contemplate provision of some legal or material benefit to
a segment of the general population, it is notable that purpose
clauses are not framed so as to require that particular benefits be
conferred upon particular persons.63 Nor are particular beneficiar-
ies granted enforceable personal rights or avenues of recourse.64
Thus, unsurprisingly, cases dealing with questions of directorial
propriety focus on conduct in light of the purposes of the corporation
62. Accountability is public, and responsibility for ensuring that directors of public pur-
pose corporations are accountable as a matter of routine, and in response to concerns about
possible wrongdoing, is the responsibility of government. See Government Corporation Con-
trol Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 9101-9110 (2012). For criticism of the Act, see Froomkin, supra note 53,
at 605-07.
63. Consider the purposes clause in the legislation establishing the National Fish and
Wildlife Foundation, a charitable corporation created by Congress in 1984. The clause states:
The purposes of the Foundation are—(1) to encourage, accept, and administer
private gifts of property for the benefit of, or in connection with, the activities
and services of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, to further the conservation and man-
agement of fish, wildlife, plants, and other natural resources; (2) to undertake
and conduct such other activities as will further the conservation and manage-
ment of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources of the United States, and its
territories and possessions, for present and future generations of Americans; and
(3) to participate with, and otherwise assist, foreign governments, entities, and
individuals in undertaking and conducting activities that will further the con-
servation and management of the fish, wildlife, and plant resources of other
countries.
16 U.S.C. § 3701(b) (2012). Notice that the purposes of the Foundation are framed in terms
of national interests and resources as well as functions and specific departments or agencies
of government.
64. Save for the public purpose corporation that issues stock to private persons. See
Froomkin, supra note 53, at 585 n.218 (explaining that accountability of government corpora-
tions differs from that of private for-profit corporations in that “‘the people’ must act through
agents, the President and Congress, whereas stockholders can in theory act directly by voting
their shares”).
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rather than the interests of persons who may have hoped to benefit
from it.65 
As was true of charitable purpose trusts, the institutional charac-
ter of the governance mandate vested in directors is reflected in the
independent and potentially perpetual existence of the entity. Public
purpose corporations have persisted over centuries notwithstanding
fluctuation in occupancy of offices within, and membership of, the
entity.66 
A public purpose corporation will cease to exist only if the state
formally dissolves it, but it is telling of the centrality of purposes to
the vitality of the corporation that it will cease to function as in-
tended if the purposes it pursues become redundant, impossible to
achieve, or are exhausted. The dependence of a public purpose cor-
poration on the continuing relevance and importance of its purposes
is reflected most vividly in the history of corporations established by
the state in emergencies. For example, the U.S. government estab-
lished several industrial corporations during World Wars I and II to
ensure that the U.S. Armed Forces were adequately supplied and
supported for war efforts.67 Many of these corporations were
dissolved soon after the wars ended because they no longer served
live public purposes. Experience with other public purpose corpora-
tions suggests that any such corporation will not long outlive its
purposes.68
65. Id. at 587-89 (noting that the courts have not clearly explained directors’ duties in gov-
ernment corporations, but arguing that even in mixed-ownership corporations the directors
appointed by private stockholders would have a “duty to give effect to the public purpose spec-
ified in an FGC’s charter”).
66. Id. at 553 (“Although the exact mix of powers granted to FGCs varies, almost every
FGC has permanent succession.”).
67. For example, the Merchant Fleet Corporation was established with congressional
authority on April 16, 1917, ten days after the United States entered World War I, and de-
scribed by the United States Supreme Court as “an instrumentality of the Government.... [but
one] organized under the general laws of the District of Columbia, as a private corporation,
with power to purchase, construct and operate merchant vessels.” United States ex rel. Skin-
ner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U.S. 1, 5 (1927) (citation omitted); see also McGuire, supra
note 50, at 182-84.
68. Consider the 2006 dissolution of the federally incorporated Rural Telephone Bank,
established pursuant to the Rural Electrification Act and 7 U.S.C. § 941, and responsible for
supporting (through provision of loans to telecom companies) broad access to conventional
telephone services in the United States, and particularly in underserviced rural areas; a pur-
pose made less pressing if not redundant by the increasing availability of low-cost cellular
telephone service. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. 15401-8-FM,
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3. Conventional Business Corporations
One might think that charitable purpose trusts and public pur-
pose corporations are outliers. Yet, fiduciary governance also plays
a role in our theoretical understanding of traditional for-profit cor-
porations. There are a number of leading theories of the firm and of
directors’ fiduciary duties, and we do not aim to adjudicate among
them. Rather, this Section will illustrate how different theories of
the firm imply that corporations are administered on the basis of
fiduciary service and fiduciary governance mandates respectively.
We will start with shareholder primacy: an account of the objects of
corporate fiduciary duties historically associated with contractarian
theories of the firm.69
Consider the classic case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.70 The plain-
tiffs, Dodge brothers, were shareholders of Ford Motor Company,
and had brought suit in light of its failure to issue a dividend. Henry
Ford dominated the board of directors and was responsible for the
policies at issue.71 The Michigan Supreme Court concluded based on
Ford’s testimony that “he thinks the Ford Motor Company has made
too much money, has had too large profits, and that, although large
profits might be still earned, a sharing of them with the public, by
reducing the price of the output of the company, ought to be under-
taken.”72 The Court then responded with a famous statement con-
cerning the ends of directorial decision making:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for
the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to
be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is to be
exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits,
or to the nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order
to devote them to other purposes.73
AUDIT REPORT: RURAL TELEPHONE BANK CLOSEOUT AUDIT (2008).
69. On some accounts, this is the prevailing theory. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439-40 (2001).
70. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
71. Id. at 683.
72. Id. at 683-84.
73. Id. at 684. The Dodge case is also notable for its language respecting corporate
purposes. The purpose the Court calls for directors to advance is not an abstract purpose but
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Delaware courts have expressed similar views, and shareholder
primacy has become one of the most influential approaches to corpo-
rate law.74 Notice, however, that implicit in shareholder primacy is
the adoption of a service-type conception of corporate fiduciary man-
dates: directors are to serve the interests of specific persons— share-
holders (who are, at a given point in time, determinate in identity
and extent of interest). Shareholders are admittedly not a uniform
group.75 Nevertheless, the members of the shareholder class can be
specified consistent with the requirement of determinate beneficia-
ries for service mandates. 
Yet there is another plausible account: in many cases, courts de-
scribe fiduciary duties as being owed to the corporation. There is, of
course, debate over how best to interpret this language. Contractar-
ians might insist that reference to corporate interests is shorthand
for the interests of shareholders in the aggregate. But others argue
that this language implies a license or authority to determine corpo-
rate interests by balancing the interests of multiple constituencies.
For example, under the team production theory of the firm, devel-
oped by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout:
Corporate law does not treat directors as shareholders’ agents
but as something quite different: independent hierarchs who are
charged not with serving shareholders’ interests alone, but with
serving the interests of the legal entity known as the “corpora-
tion.” The interests of the corporation, in turn, can be under-
stood as a joint welfare function of all the individuals who make
firm-specific investments and agree to participate in the extra-
contractual, internal mediation process within the firm.76
instead one defined in terms of the interests of determinate beneficiaries. Id.
74. See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (“It is the obliga-
tion of directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the corpo-
ration’s stockholders; that they may sometimes do so ‘at the expense’ of others (even assuming
that a transaction which one may refuse to enter into can meaningfully be said to be at his
expense) does not for that reason constitute a breach of duty.”) (footnote omitted).
75. See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA
L. REV. 561, 577-78 (2006). It may even be possible on some accounts to adopt a shareholder
primacy perspective while not recognizing a determinate group of beneficiaries; this could
result from a view that leaves open the question of time horizons, for example.  Our point for
present purposes is that shareholder primacy can implicate a service mandate.
76. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247, 288 (1999); cf. D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP.
L. 277, 284 (1998) (“Some applications of the fiduciary principle in corporate law do not
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The set of interests that may be considered in determining “corpo-
rate” interests is thus quite broad. As Blair and Stout note: “For
most public corporations, these are primarily executives, rank-and-
file employees, and equity investors, but in particular cases the cor-
porate team may also include other stakeholders such as creditors,
or even the local community if the firm has strong geographic ties.”77
The team production theory of the firm implies that corporate
fiduciary mandates are properly understood as governance-type
mandates. Whereas shareholder primacy implies that directors hold
service-type mandates to administer the affairs of the corporation
for a specific beneficiary (shareholders in the aggregate), the team
production theory suggests instead that directors are granted gov-
ernance-type mandates to act for purposes that encompass but
transcend the interests of various constituencies. It consequently
becomes impossible to specify particular beneficiaries of the exer-
cise of power by boards. As Blair and Stout point out: “[D]irectors
are allowed free rein to consider and make trade-offs between the
conflicting interests of different corporate constituencies.”78 These
tradeoffs, in turn, are designed to maximize the joint welfare
function of the constituents who comprise the firm. Directors look
out for firm interests by serving as neutral, “mediating hierarchs,”
language that is highly evocative of the function of the state.79
There is, however, a further possibility: corporate law may be am-
bivalent as to corporate purpose. In recent case law, the Delaware
Supreme Court has indicated that directors owe fiduciary duties to
“the corporation and its shareholders.”80 It is possible to interpret
this language as allowing for a stakeholder-oriented analysis. But
another interpretation, consistent with the structural features of
require the identification of any particular corporate constituency as beneficiary, but only that
the interests of ‘the corporation’ in general must be served.” (citing ADOLF A. BERLE &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 197-202 (rev. ed.
1967))).
77. Blair & Stout, supra note 76, at 288.
78. Id. at 291.
79. Cf. Ethan J. Leib et al., Mapping Public Fiduciary Relationships, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 401 (suggesting, with respect to legislators,
that “[a]nalogies to corporate fiduciary law not only inform how to think through identification
of relevant beneficiaries; they also usefully frame identification of relevant fiduciaries”).
80. See, e.g., N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99
(Del. 2007) (“It is well established that the directors owe their fiduciary obligations to the
corporation and its shareholders.”).
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Delaware law, suggests that the ambiguity is intentional.81 At
times, the Delaware courts appear sympathetic to shareholder pri-
macy, at other times, less so. For a variety of reasons, ambivalence
on corporate purpose may be a core feature of the law, one that
underscores the broad functional flexibility of the corporate form of
organization.82 If this view is correct, Delaware corporate law is
consistent both with accounts that presuppose service-type man-
dates and those that presuppose governance-type mandates.
II. GOVERNANCE-TYPE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS AND FIDUCIARY
LIABILITY
Fiduciary relationships and liability are usually analyzed on the
assumption that all fiduciary mandates are service mandates. In
this Part, we will explain more precisely how fiduciary governance
diverges from standard accounts of fiduciary law and will suggest
how these accounts may be amended to accommodate it.
A. The Fiduciary Powers Theory of the Fiduciary Relationship
A key concern once we recognize fiduciary governance mandates
is to figure out how they can be reconciled with theories of the fi-
duciary relationship. In previous work, one of us has articulated a
general theory of the fiduciary relationship—the fiduciary powers
theory.83 As we will develop, this theory enables us to make sense of
governance mandates. It will be necessary, however, to make appro-
priate modifications to the theory. We will thus start by introduc-
ing the fiduciary powers theory in its original form. The fiduciary
81. For accounts suggesting Delaware corporate law is ambivalent on the target of fidu-
ciary duties, see Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59
ALA. L. REV. 1385, 1386 (2008), and Andrew S. Gold, Theories of the Firm and Judicial
Uncertainty, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1087, 1093 (2012).
82. On the reasons for indeterminacy in Delaware corporate law, see Bruner, supra note
81, at 1431-32; Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1063-64 (2000); Andrew S. Gold, Dynamic Fidu-
ciary Duties, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 491, 522-26 (2012); and Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competi-
tion Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1913-19 (1998).
83. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 1, at 69-75; see also Paul B. Miller, A
Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235, 277 (2011) [hereinafter Miller, Theory];
Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, supra note 5, at 1016-21; Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fidu-
ciary Remedies, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 570, 601-04 (2013).
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powers theory recognizes the central conceptual role reserved for
fiduciary relationships in fiduciary law. On this account, fiduciary
duties arise relationally and are understood as securing the in-
tegrity of the fiduciary relationship. The core contribution of the
fiduciary powers theory lies in its clarification of distinctive formal
properties of fiduciary relationships.
The fiduciary powers theory offers the following definition of
fiduciary relationships: “[A] fiduciary relationship is one in which
one party (the fiduciary) enjoys discretionary power over the signif-
icant practical interests of another (the beneficiary).”84 As this lan-
guage suggests, like other accounts of fiduciary relationships, the
fiduciary powers theory was developed with service-type relation-
ships in mind. 
Consistent with this understanding, the fiduciary powers theory
conceives of fiduciary power as being held by fiduciaries relative to
beneficiaries. Fiduciary powers are understood as a kind of legal
power premised on the fiduciary’s enjoyment of a form of legal
authority derived from the legal personality of another person. A fi-
duciary receives her authority by grant from another person who, in
acting on her personal legal authority in making the grant, confers
powers on the fiduciary and so empowers (authorizes) the fiduciary
person to act for her. 
Fiduciary power implies the freedom to engage in conduct not
otherwise open to its bearer. This follows from the fact that powers
associated with legal personality are themselves personal in na-
ture. An individual possessed of personality is the presumptive
bearer of capacities and powers to act in her own name. The inves-
titure of power in a fiduciary alters the normative basis upon which
fiduciaries, beneficiaries, and benefactors interact amongst them-
selves and with third parties. The fiduciary, by virtue of her man-
date, enjoys standing (authority) to make discretionary decisions for
or on behalf of her beneficiary or benefactor that she would not
otherwise have the standing to make.85
Consistent with the fact that it was developed with a mind to
service-type mandates, the fiduciary powers theory assumes the
84. Miller, Theory, supra note 83, at 262 (emphasis omitted).
85. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1400-03; D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, Fiduciary
Discretion, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 609-13 (2014); Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation,
25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 1-3 (1975).
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existence of a beneficiary. It thus points out that fiduciary powers
are held relative to the practical interests of beneficiaries and ex-
plains what makes an interest of a person “practical.” The theory
emphasizes the delimited nature of fiduciary authority and the
correspondingly narrow scope of fiduciary powers by explaining that
the latter are properly exercised only relative to the pertinent inter-
ests of beneficiaries in order to advance or promote those interests.
B. Conventional Fiduciary Relationships
The fiduciary powers theory and other theoretical accounts as-
sume a conventional service-type relationship in which the fiduciary
is engaged to administer the affairs of a person (or group of per-
sons), or to administer property for the benefit of a specific person
(or group of persons). Our brief summary of the fiduciary powers
theory explained the basic nature of these relationships. To offer a
more textured perspective, we will presently discuss the formation
of conventional fiduciary relationships, their composition, and their
core function. 
Conventional fiduciary relationships are typically formed by mu-
tual consent of the fiduciary and beneficiary.86 The circumstances in
which fiduciaries and beneficiaries come together vary. In many
cases, the fiduciary offers fiduciary services to the general public;
the beneficiary, attracted by that offer, enters into a contract for
services with the fiduciary.87 In other circumstances, a beneficiary
may seek out the fiduciary, or vice versa, on the basis of trust rooted
in some personal connection (as often happens in the context of
family trusts).88 In all events, the agreement between the parties
86. See Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 1, at 74-75. See generally Matthew
Conaglen, Fiduciary Duties and Voluntary Undertakings, 7 J. EQUITY 105 (2013); James
Edelman, When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?, 126 LAW Q. REV. 302 (2010); Joshua Getzler,
Ascribing and Limiting Fiduciary Obligations: Understanding the Operation of Consent, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 39.
87. See generally Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C.
L. REV. 595 (1997); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14; Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fidu-
ciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899 (2011); D. Gordon Smith, Contractually Adopted Fiduciary
Duty, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1783.
88. See generally Frankel, supra note 2; Matthew Harding, Trust and Fiduciary Law, 33
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 81 (2013); Richard Holton, Fiduciary Relations and the Nature of
Trust, 91 B.U. L. REV. 991 (2011); David J. Seipp, Trust and Fiduciary Duty in the Early Com-
mon Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1011 (2011).
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effectuates an authorization and transfer of power from beneficiary
to fiduciary. 
The mutual consent of fiduciary and beneficiary is not the only
mode of relationship formation.89 In some circumstances, the bene-
ficiary is legally incapable of personally consenting to the formation
of a fiduciary relationship to which he is a party. In other circum-
stances, the beneficiary may enjoy capacity but lack the authority
to bring the relationship about through personal consent. 
First consider beneficiaries who lack capacity. A personified enti-
ty, for example, will always lack legal capacity in its own right. It
falls upon fiduciary representatives of the entity (such as directors
of a corporation) to engage another fiduciary (a lawyer, for example)
on behalf of the beneficiary.90 Children and incapable adults also
lack the legal capacity to establish a fiduciary relationship through
personal consent. Thus, a child’s parents or the state may consent
to a fiduciary relationship on behalf of the child, such as when the
state places a child in foster care or a parent delegates parental
authority to a caregiver.91 
Consider now circumstances in which the beneficiary lacks not
capacity but authority. In some circumstances a fiduciary acts on
powers derived from a third-party benefactor, such as the settlor of
a trust.92 In cases like this, the fiduciary relationship is formed by
the benefactor and fiduciary to facilitate a mediated benefaction to
beneficiaries.93 The beneficiary does not, and cannot, establish the
89. See Miller, Theory, supra note 83, at 252-53, 265-67, 278-79.
90. Of course, as the literature on lawyers as gatekeepers for shareholders indicates, the
authority of a fiduciary to delegate to a subordinate fiduciary can create its own set of agency
problems. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third Party Enforcement
Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53-55 (1986). See generally JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATE-
KEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1-10 (2006); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L.
REV. 301 (2004); Frank Partnoy, Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified
Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L. REV. 491 (2001); Andrew F. Tuch, Multiple Gatekeep-
ers, 96 VA. L. REV. 1583 (2010).
91. For an example of a statutory scheme governing delegation of parental authority, see
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6550-6552 (West 2014).
92. See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J.
625, 646-47 (1995).
93. The mediated nature of the benefaction necessarily contemplates interpolation of the
trustee between settlor and beneficiary. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 18, at 579
(“By making a transfer in trust rather than outright, a settlor ensures that the property will
be managed and distributed in accordance with his wishes as expressed in the terms of the
2015] FIDUCIARY GOVERNANCE 543
relationship because he lacks legal authority in respect of the ben-
efaction (disposition of the property that comprises the gift). The
beneficiary’s involvement is consensual in that it is for him to decide
whether to accept the benefaction. But his consent is not instrumen-
tal; indeed, if he refuses the benefaction, the mandate may still be
executed for the benefit of someone else. 
The formation of conventional fiduciary relationships is telling of
their constitution. All conventional fiduciary relationships feature,
as parties, at least one fiduciary and one beneficiary. In some cases,
several fiduciaries may serve one beneficiary under a given mandate
as when a team of lawyers represents one client. In other cases, one
fiduciary may serve a group of beneficiaries, such as a pension fund
manager serving the interests of all subscribers. Similarly, several
fiduciaries may serve a group of beneficiaries. There are other possi-
ble concatenations. When a mandate is created by a benefactor, the
fiduciary relationship includes the benefactor insofar as he enjoys
some legal standing (albeit often of a limited nature) during the
currency of the mandate.94 When a mandate has been established
for a beneficiary by a fiduciary, that fiduciary will often stand in the
stead of the beneficiary, with the first fiduciary standing to the
second fiduciary as monitor and enforcer.95 
Fiduciaries in conventional fiduciary relationships act on discre-
tionary powers to pursue ends that engage the practical interests of
determinate beneficiaries. In contrast to governance-type mandates,
the objects of their authority are defined in terms of the interests of
the beneficiaries. Indeed, ordinarily a service-type mandate would
be hopelessly vague if these interests were not so defined. For ex-
ample, a client facing divorce must specify for the benefit of his law-
yer his interests in family property and child custody arrangements.
trust rather than the whims of the beneficiaries.”).
94. Id. at 779-80 (describing the gradual expansion of settlor standing to enforce chari-
table purpose trusts over the past ten to fifteen years); see also UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c)
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
95. The role of monitor and enforcer is seen to be so important in trust law that some
jurisdictions, recognizing possible circumstances of beneficiary passivity, have permitted the
appointment of dedicated trust protectors or enforcers. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs
Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 670-71 (2004). See generally Gregory S. Alex-
ander, Trust Protectors: Who Will Watch the Watchmen?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2807 (2006);
Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2761 (2006).
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The same is true of any other service-type mandate that one might
care to contemplate. We cannot understand what the fiduciary is
called upon to do unless we place some construction on the interests
of the beneficiary.
Appreciation of the relational positioning of the beneficiary is also
essential to our understanding of the functions of conventional
fiduciary relationships. These relationships enable individuals and
groups to avail themselves of the skill, knowledge, and other per-
sonal resources of fiduciaries in pursuing ends relating to their in-
terests or those of their designated beneficiaries.96 As one of us has
argued elsewhere, fiduciary authority may thus be understood as
facilitating a kind of substitution, whereby one person may be
granted standing to act as we are presumptively alone authorized
to act in pursuit of our purposes.97 Service-type relationships are
distinguished from governance-type relationships not in terms of
their function but instead in terms of their ends. Whereas in a
conventional fiduciary relationship the fiduciary stands in substitu-
tion for another in acting in the interests of determinate persons, in
institutional fiduciary relationships the fiduciary is to act for stipu-
lated purposes that transcend the interests of determinate persons.
C. The Usual Structure of Fiduciary Liability
Fiduciary liability usually has an interpersonal structure.
Principles of fiduciary liability govern the bilateral relationship be-
tween fiduciary and beneficiary. They are occasioned by that rela-
tionship and provide the terms under which fiduciary service
mandates are to be carried out for the benefit of the beneficiary. 
In fiduciary law, as in other areas of private law, interpersonal
principles of liability make one person accountable to another in
respect of interpersonal conduct. Generally speaking, interpersonal
accountability is effectuated through correlative rights and duties.98
96. Dagan & Hannes, supra note 14, at 92.
97. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 1, at 71-72; see also Evan J. Criddle,
Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 126 (2006).
98. Corrective justice theorists emphasize this point (though note that recognition of the
fact that rights and duties are structured bilaterally is consistent with different views on the
general structure of private liability and the ideas(s) of justice that animate private law). On
the bilateral or correlative structure of private law rights and duties, see Andrew S. Gold, A
Moral Rights Theory of Private Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1873, 1885-87 (2011); see also
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One party to a relationship will enjoy a bilaterally or omnilaterally
held99 legal right correlative to which the other party is subject to a
legal duty. Correlative rights and duties are structural and substan-
tive mirror images of each other.100 Structurally, the right entails a
correlative duty, for without the duty the right is incapable of
securing the value or interest that justifies it. Substantively, the
right and duty express one and the same norm of conduct, with the
right being framed in terms of the right holder’s enforceable claim
and the duty being framed in terms of conditions of compliance. 
It is characteristic of correlative rights and duties that their
content is explained and justified in light of normatively salient
interests of the right holder.101 Thus, though reasonable people
differ in how they define and attach salience to these interests, we
ordinarily think that the possessory rights of property owners are
to be understood in terms of owners’ interests in the institution of
ownership, that rights to the integrity of our person and reputation
reflect our interests in same, and so on.102 It is, by implication, also
ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 9-12 (2012); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF
PRIVATE LAW 115-20 (1995) [hereinafter WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW]; Jules L.
Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 427, 436-37 (1992)
[hereinafter Coleman, The Mixed Conception]; Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective
Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 30-31 (1995); Stephen Darwall & Julian Darwall, Civil Recourse
as Mutual Accountability, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 17, 18-20 (2011); Richard A. Epstein, Nui-
sance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (1979);
John Gardner, What Is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW & PHIL.
1, 1 (2011).
99. On omnilaterally held rights in tort and property law, see Lisa M. Austin, Possession
and the Distractions of Philosophy, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 182,
191-95 (James Penner & Henry E. Smith eds., 2013), and Gregory C. Keating, The Priority
of Respect over Repair, 18 LEGAL THEORY 293, 321-23 (2012).
100. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 98, at 123 (“Right and duty—and
therefore plaintiff and defendant—are connected because the content of the right is the object
of the duty.”).
101. Of course, reasonable opinions widely vary in terms of the criteria of normative
salience. For some, the law must be understood as protecting the interests of persons on the
basis of the objective value of those interests for persons. Others argue that interests are
protected insofar as they are to be understood as emanations of moral personality, the value
of which is in turn analyzed in terms of human dignity, freedom, and equality. On the signif-
icance of interests to rights in general, see generally NEIL MACCORMICK, LEGAL RIGHT AND
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY (1977); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); Matthew H.
Kramer, Refining the Interest Theory of Rights, 55 AM. J. JURIS. 31 (2010); and Joseph Raz,
Rights and Politics, 71 IND. L.J. 27 (1995).
102. Some property theorists define owners’ interests in terms of the use of owned property.
See J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 5 (1997); Henry E. Smith, Emergent Property,
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characteristic of private law wrongs and remedies that they reflect
the impact of wrongdoing on the interests of a right holder. Thus, for
example, it is difficult to talk about what makes negligence wrongful
without discussing persons’ interests in being free of injury and, in
turn, without considering the difficult question of what kinds of
interests are or should be protected by the duty of care in tort law
(for example, physical, psychological, economic).103 The interests of
right holders are also important in understanding the function and
justification of remedies. Hence, compensatory damages in negli-
gence are determined by the nature and extent of the injuries suf-
fered by the victim of the tort (in other words, the measurable
extent of setback to her interests).104 
What we have just said of the interpersonal structure of private
liability in general captures the usual structure of fiduciary liability.
As noted earlier, fiduciary duties are occasioned by the establish-
ment of a fiduciary relationship to which, conventionally, at least
one fiduciary and one beneficiary are parties. Fiduciary duties
ensure that fiduciaries are accountable to beneficiaries for the way
in which they execute their mandate. The fiduciary owes certain
legal duties to the beneficiary and the beneficiary in turn enjoys cor-
relative claim rights as against the fiduciary.105 Thus, by virtue of
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 99, at 320, 330-31; Henry E.
Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1692-93 (2012). Others define
owners’ interests in terms of exclusion. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S
LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 90-91 (2009); Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right
to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998).
103. This is a point of considerable consensus even among scholars with widely divergent
normative presuppositions. See Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILO-
SOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 321 (David G. Owen ed., 1997); Arthur Ripstein, The
Philosophy of Tort Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 656, 656-57 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002); Coleman, The Mixed Conception,
supra note 98, at 427; Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151,
151-53 (1973); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917, 918 (2010); Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 29-30 (1972).
104. Allowing that compensatory damages may imperfectly compensate for the setback to
one’s interests. See Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 67, 98 n.86 (2010) (“[W]e also do not have a clear picture of how compensation
remedies a wrong. The standard lines—that damages make the victim whole or return her
to her preinjury state—are often false, and sometimes cruelly so.”). But cf. Andrew S. Gold,
A Theory of Redressive Justice, 64 U. TORONTO L.J. 159, 174-76 (2014) (indicating that imper-
fect compensation can still be consistent with corrective justice).
105. See DeMott, supra note 4, at 882 (“If a person in a particular relationship with another
is subject to a fiduciary obligation, that person (the fiduciary) must be loyal to the interests of
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the relationship established between them, the fiduciary is obli-
gated to show due care for the beneficiaries’ interests in executing
a fiduciary mandate, and each beneficiary has an enforceable cor-
relative claim right to the fiduciary’s care. Likewise, conventional
fiduciary relationships give rise to a duty of loyalty requiring the
fiduciary to pay exclusive regard to the interests of the beneficiaries,
and each beneficiary has a correlative claim right to the fiduciary’s
loyalty. 
The interpersonal character of conventional fiduciary liability is
also reflected in the content of fiduciary rights and duties. Thus, the
duty of care contemplates the impact of the fiduciary’s conduct on
the interests of the beneficiary. Fiduciaries are required to take care
to avoid causing injury to the interests of their beneficiaries.106
Conventional standards of conduct associated with the duty of
loyalty are likewise defined in terms of the beneficiary and her
interests.107 For example, the well-known proscriptive rules (no
profit, no conflict) require the fiduciary to consider and act upon the
interests of the beneficiary alone in executing her mandate.108
Prescriptive rules (including fairness, demonstrable partiality, and
the other person (the beneficiary).”) (emphasis added); Smith, supra note 3, at 1408 (“The duty
that is distinctive of fiduciaries arises out of a concern that the fiduciary will take advantage
of the beneficiary.”) (emphasis added).
106. Thus, for example, cases on the corporate law fiduciary duty of care analyze the
conduct of fiduciaries in terms of the interests of corporations and their stakeholders. See, e.g.,
Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929) (suggesting that liability for care-
lessness will arise when there is “a reckless indifference to or a deliberate disregard of the
interests of the whole body of stockholders”); see also Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del.
1939) (holding that the fiduciary relationship between a corporation and its directors requires
the latter to “scrupulous[ly] observ[e] [their] duty, not only affirmatively to protect the
interests of the corporation ... but also to refrain from doing anything that [might injure] the
corporation”).
107. See Smith, supra note 3, at 1410 (arguing that fiduciaries “must refrain from self-in-
terested behavior that wrongs the beneficiary”); Julian Velasco, A Defense of the Fiduciary
Duty of Care, 40 J. CORP. L. 647, 648 (2015) (arguing that all fiduciary duties reflect an
overarching “duty to act in the interests of the beneficiary in all relevant respects”). On the
content of the duty of loyalty more broadly, see generally Andrew S. Gold, The Loyalties of
Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 176.
108. The classical formulation is found in Aberdeen Railway Co. v. Blaikie Bros.: “[N]o one,
having [fiduciary] duties to discharge, shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which
he has, or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the
interests of those whom he is bound to protect.” (1854) 1 Macq. 461 (H.L.) 471 (appeal taken
from Scot.). See also, in the trust law context, In re Will of Gleeson, 124 N.E.2d 624, 626 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1955), and In re Kilmer’s Will, 61 N.Y.S.2d 51, 54 (Sur. Ct. 1946).
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best-interests standards) are also formulated with reference to the
interests of beneficiaries.109 
D. Governance-Type Relationships: Revisiting the Fiduciary
Powers Theory
The prevalence of fiduciary governance raises important ques-
tions about the nature of fiduciary relationships and the structure
of fiduciary liability. The fact that governance mandates are estab-
lished for the benefit of purposes rather than specific persons might
suggest that fiduciary duties may arise independently of fiduciary
relationships and thus that fiduciary liability is not inherently
relational. Put simply, a fiduciary who undertakes a governance
mandate would appear to be bound to respect its purposes but not
to owe legal duties relating to the performance of his mandate to
anyone in particular, simply because there is no one with a fixed
beneficial interest in the mandate.
In this Section we will argue that these impressions are mis-
taken. Governance mandates do have relational features, but
governance-type fiduciary relationships can and should be differen-
tiated from service-type relationships. The fiduciary powers theory
provides a way of explaining governance-type relationships in a
manner that captures their distinctive qualities while showing that
they are of the same genus as service-type relationships. In brief, we
argue that governance-type fiduciary relationships share essential
formal properties with service-type relationships, save that they are
established with different objects. As we will demonstrate, this point
of distinction is not simply analytical; it has broader consequences
for our understanding of the nature of fiduciary relationships and
the circumstances in which they arise.
The fiduciary powers theory suggests that fiduciary relationships
are distinguished by the fiduciary’s possession and exercise of other-
109. Consider John Langbein’s analysis of the content of the trust law duty of loyalty in
terms of whether the duty ought to prescribe—as it currently does—that trustees consider
only the interests of beneficiaries or instead what is in their best interests. See John H.
Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE
L.J. 929, 981 (2005) (“In place of ‘no further inquiry,’ allow inquiry. Allow a trustee who is
sued for a breach of the duty of loyalty to prove that the conflicted transaction was prudently
undertaken in the best interest of the beneficiary.”).
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regarding discretionary powers. The theory contemplates service-
type relationships. However, it can readily be broadened to encom-
pass and explain governance-type relationships. To this end, we
suggest the following extended definition of the fiduciary relation-
ship:
A fiduciary relationship is one in which one person (the fidu-
ciary) enjoys discretionary power to pursue an abstract other-
regarding purpose or the significant practical interests of another
person (an individual beneficiary or ascertained set of beneficia-
ries).
This revised definition reflects our above-noted view that all fidu-
ciary mandates are purposive, although the purposes specified for
some mandates are defined in terms of the interests of determinate
persons while others are abstract in that they are defined such that
they transcend the interests of determinate persons. The definition
retains the general claim that all fiduciary relationships are distin-
guished by the nature of the powers wielded by fiduciaries.110 To
summarize: fiduciary powers are legal powers enjoyed on the footing
of authority derived from the personal legal authority of legal per-
sons. Fiduciary authority consists in the standing to make decisions
for or on behalf of another person in the exercise of legal powers.
Fiduciary powers, like personal legal powers, are wide-ranging:
fiduciaries regularly act on behalf of others on the footing of contract
(for example, in contract negotiation, formation, performance, and
exercise of contractual rights); in dealings with respect to proper-
ty, investments, and commercial matters (for example, in selling,
licensing, and granting permissions in respect of tangible and intel-
lectual property); and in making sensitive decisions with respect to
110. We have made two additional modifications aimed at clarifying the conception of the
fiduciary relationship that underlies the definition. First, we refer to enjoyment rather than
exercise of fiduciary powers in recognition of the fact that fiduciaries may, in fact, exercise
their powers for any number of reasons and that, in distinguishing fiduciary from non-fidu-
ciary powers, our attention is properly directed to the basis on which the powers are held as
such. Second, we say that fiduciaries enjoy discretionary powers to advance beneficiaries’
practical interests rather than merely over their interests to underscore the fact that all
fiduciary powers held under service mandates are impressed with a purpose that contem-
plates advancement of beneficiaries’ interests in some sense and to differentiate fiduciary
powers from other legal and factual powers that may be (and usually are) held “over” or
exercised “relative to” other persons.
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matters of personal care (for example, making medical treatment or
custodial care decisions).
Fiduciaries who serve under governance mandates undertake
and act on fiduciary powers so construed. The powers that they
exercise are derived from benefactors. Consider the trustee of a
charitable purpose trust. The trustee is authorized to act as a
trustee, and is granted specific powers of trusteeship (including
conventional powers to invest and maintain trust property, advance
capital, and distribute income) by the declaration of trust made by
the settlor.111 Her position of authority and possession of fiduciary
powers are essential to her ability to act in a legally effective way in
advancing the purposes of the trust. And in assuming and acting on
her mandate, the trustee stands in the stead of the settlor acting on
authority derived from that of the settlor, through powers derived
ultimately from the settlor’s ownership powers in relation to the
property settled on trust. 
Whereas trustees of charitable purpose trusts receive authority
and power by delegation from private persons, directors of public
purpose corporations receive their mandate from the state. There
are undoubtedly significant differences between the legal personal-
ity of the state and that of natural persons, some of which may be
relevant to the authority of the state to delegate power on a fiduci-
ary basis. We cannot, and need not, delve into these issues here. For
present purposes, it suffices to recognize that the state can and does
routinely delegate authority through the creation of public offices,
agencies, and institutions mandated to pursue public purposes.112
Directors and officers of public purpose corporations receive their
mandate through legislative or executive acts whereby the state es-
tablishes (a) the corporation; (b) its purposes; (c) the offices through
which the corporation will be administered; (d) the powers attached
111. See generally UNIF. TRS.’ POWERS ACT § 3(c), 7C U.L.A. 689 (2006); UNIF. TRUST CODE
§ 816 (amended 2005), 7C U.L.A. 627 (2006).
112. Field, supra note 49, at 782 (“It seems pretty clear that the national government may
use the corporate form as an administrative device for carrying out any power that it can exer-
cise. The question is sometimes asked: for what purposes can Congress create a government
corporation? The answer is, of course, that such a corporation can be created for any
constitutional federal purpose.”); Froomkin, supra note 53, at 551-53. For cases in which the
federal government’s power to establish specific public purpose corporations has been upheld
in the face of constitutional challenge, see Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S.
180, 211 (1921), and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421-22 (1819).
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to the corporation and its offices; and (e) other details in respect of
corporate governance, reporting, and accountability.113 
Just as fiduciary service mandates and relationships serve to
facilitate extension of the personality of persons through delegation
of powers to promote the ends of particular persons, governance
mandates enable extension of the personality of persons through
delegation of powers to promote particular abstract purposes. Both
kinds of fiduciary relationship permit those who establish them to
avail themselves of the resources and capacities of others in advan-
cing the cause of specified purposes or persons. Thus, fiduciary
relationships: make it possible for individuals to make more produc-
tive and valuable use of their personal powers than would otherwise
be possible;114 advance private ordering by facilitating self-directed
coordination and association of persons for common purposes; and
permit the state to more efficiently and effectively accomplish its
responsibility to govern in the public interest.115
Having established that governance-type fiduciary relationships,
like service-type relationships, are distinguished by the fiduciary’s
possession and exercise of delegated power, we may now consider
ancillary issues, including relationship formation and the relational
character and objects of fiduciary authority.
As noted above, service-type fiduciary relationships are often
formed by a beneficiary and fiduciary for the beneficiary’s own bene-
fit. Governance-type relationships, by contrast, are instead premised
on a benefaction—an act whereby one person aims to confer benefits
through stipulated abstract purposes. Fiduciary powers are often
derived from the person of the benefactor acting in her own stead.
113. And as is true of declarations of trust for charitable purpose trusts, the powers confer-
red on directors of public purpose corporations are almost always carefully delineated. See,
for example, the statutory language in the legislation establishing the National Fish and
Wildlife Foundation, discussed supra note 63. The powers of the Foundation are outlined at
16 U.S.C. § 3703 and incorporate eleven distinct grants of authority. See 16 U.S.C. § 3703(c)
(2012).
114. Dagan & Hannes, supra note 14, at 92.
115. Froomkin, supra note 53, at 557 (“The classic reason given for creating an FGC
instead of an agency ... is that an FGC will be more efficient at achieving a specific national
goal.”); Schnell, supra note 50, at 241 (“[T]he corporate form is a convenient method of
operation providing elasticity of control and freedom from the usual governmental red tape....
[T]he ordinary machinery of government is too cumbersome to operate speedily and effi-
ciently.”) (footnote omitted); see also U.S. Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp. v. W. Union
Tel. Co., 275 U.S. 415, 423 (1928).
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However, they may also arise from further (second order) delegation
by a fiduciary.116 The precise manner in which a benefactor will
establish a governance mandate will vary depending on whether she
is a natural or legal person, on whether she is acting in a personal
or fiduciary capacity, and on the nature of the powers she wishes to
confer. 
Take the relatively simple case of the charitable purpose trust.
Here, the mandate conferred upon the trustee is a product of mutual
consent reflected in the trustee undertaking trusteeship on terms
set forth in the declaration of trust made by the settlor.117 By con-
trast, public fiduciary governance mandates are often established
through the exercise of sui generis powers of the state.118 For exam-
ple, an official with requisite authority in the executive branch may
create an office and appoint an official by executive order, in which
case the governance mandate undertaken by the appointee is the
product of the order itself.
Whatever the nature of a governance mandate, and however it
may be conferred, it should be evident that the powers enjoyed by
the fiduciary are derivative of powers enjoyed by the benefactor and
are granted and held in a relational context defined by purposes
specified by the benefactor. The key to appreciating the differences
in the constitution of governance-type and service-type relationships
lies in recognizing that the former are institutional rather than
interpersonal. There is no privity binding the fiduciary to another
determinate person. Instead, the fiduciary relates to, and more
specifically reports to, persons who occupy monitoring and enforce-
ment roles relative to the fiduciary in respect of the mandate. In
some cases, this role may be occupied by the benefactor, as when the
government relies on the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
to supervise public purpose corporations. In other cases, the role
may be occupied by co-fiduciaries, as occurs within a fiduciary
collective like a board or in hierarchical fiduciary structures. In yet
116. See McGuire, supra note 50, at 189 (characterizing the federal government as a corpo-
ration and public purpose corporations as subsidiary corporations).
117. The fact that these and other donative trusts are established by the mutual consent
of the settlor (benefactor) and trustee has inspired contractarian analyses of trust law includ-
ing, notably, that of Langbein, supra note 92, at 627-31. But see M.W. LAU, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF TRUSTS 22-25 (2011).
118. See Froomkin, supra note 53, at 551-52; McGuire, supra note 50, at 182-84.
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other circumstances, monitoring and enforcement rights may be
extended to representatives of constituencies committed to the
purposes of a fiduciary institution, such as donors, volunteers, or
other members of a charitable organization.
Governance-type fiduciary mandates diverge from service-type
mandates primarily in respect of their objects. In a governance-type
relationship, the fiduciary is empowered to advance certain pur-
poses of a benefactor stipulated independently of the interests of
particular persons who may stand to benefit from pursuit of same.
The objects of governance-type mandates are often statements of
common purpose that define the general nature and specific institu-
tional mission of private associations or of public purpose for entities
established for the benefit of the general public. Thus, for example,
a person who incorporates a charity for the purpose of promoting
family literacy must be understood as having conferred upon the
trustees the authority and power to pursue that purpose.119
E. Accountability in Fiduciary Governance: Rethinking Fiduciary
Liability
Governance-type fiduciary relationships arise and are carried on
relationally, but they have an institutional nature. They do not
embed an expectation of privity and are characterized by fluidity in
composition while manifesting stability in institutional form and
function over time. A given fiduciary governance mandate may re-
sult in relationships implicating several successive fiduciaries and
monitors/enforcers; likewise, the characteristics and composition of
the population intended to ultimately benefit from the mandate will
often change over time. These qualities reflect, of course, the fact
that governance mandates are concerned with advancement of pur-
poses that, by definition, transcend determinate persons and are
often atemporal.
The interpersonal nature of the service-type fiduciary relation-
ship is reflected in the principles of liability rules it attracts.
Fiduciary liability is, again, conventionally premised on correla-
tively structured rights and duties that make fiduciaries directly
119. See, e.g., BARBARA BUSH FOUND. FOR FAMILY LITERACY, http://www.barbarabush.org
[http://perma.cc/ELM5-VVCS] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
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and personally accountable to beneficiaries for the way in which
they perform their mandates. This is consistent with the typically
interpersonal character of liability in private law and the fact that
all service-type mandates have as their object advancement of
interests of determinate persons.
Just as it is often assumed that all fiduciary relationships are
service-type relationships, so too (and perhaps in consequence) it is
usually assumed that fiduciary liability is strictly interpersonal.120
Fiduciary law, it is said, makes fiduciaries accountable to beneficia-
ries and thus insulates the latter from vulnerabilities occasioned by
the risk of abuse or misuse of fiduciary power.121 This view is sound
as far as it goes, but it is incomplete as a statement of the general
nature of fiduciary liability. The characteristics of governance-type
fiduciary mandates suggest that fiduciary law is equally concerned
with ensuring that fiduciaries respect other-regarding purposes
underlying their mandates. The institutional nature of governance-
type relationships is also reflected in principles of liability applica-
ble to them.
Fiduciary accountability under governance-type mandates is
structurally institutional in that it is served by standalone duties
that may be enforced by any of a number of persons or entities occu-
pying a monitoring and enforcement role in respect of the mandate.
Fiduciary duties are, in this context, standalone duties in just the
sense articulated by Ronen Perry: the duties do not imply a correla-
tive claim right that is enjoyed and may be asserted by a right
holder in her personal capacity.122 Like any legal duty, standalone
120. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
121. This view has been argued most exhaustively by Frankel, supra note 2, at 809-12. See
also Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Char-
acter and Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1048 (1991); DeMott, supra note 4, at
902 (“In many relationships in which one party is bound by a fiduciary obligation, the other
party’s vulnerability to the fiduciary’s abuse of power or influence conventionally justifies the
imposition of fiduciary obligation.”); Smith, supra note 3, at 1404 (speaking of “the benefici-
ary’s vulnerability [as] emanat[ing] from an inability to protect against opportunism by the
fiduciary with respect to [a] critical resource”).
122. Ronen Perry, Correlativity, 28 LAW & PHIL. 537, 537 (2009). Or, as rights theorists
would have it, fiduciary duties are non-directed in that, in contrast to the directed duties gen-
erated by service-type relationships, they do not give rise to claim rights held by persons with
the standing to enjoy and enforce such rights in a personal capacity. We recognize, of course,
that recognition of standing to enforce fiduciary duties is not in itself telling of whether a fi-
duciary relationship is of a governance- or service-type. Standing to enforce personal claim
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fiduciary duties do establish mandatory, enforceable norms of con-
duct. But unlike correlative duties, they are not owed to any partic-
ular person.123
That governance mandates attract standalone duties reflects the
fact that they are established for purposes rather than determinate
persons; the undefined and contingent nature of individuals’ bene-
ficial interests in governance mandates makes it impossible to rec-
ognize individuated claim rights in them.124 This point is amply
evidenced in practice. No individual is recognized as holding a
personal claim right to the beneficial exercise of discretionary power
by a trustee in a charitable purpose trust. Instead, the standalone
duties of the trustee are enforced by parties who have been assigned
monitoring and enforcement powers, such as state charities agen-
cies, co-trustees, and courts. Likewise, no one may be said to enjoy
a personal claim right rooted in a beneficial interest in fiduciary ad-
ministration of public purpose corporations. Instead, the fiduciary
duties of directors are enforced by the state through its officials (for
example, the GAO).
The institutional nature of the accountability of fiduciaries un-
der governance mandates is also reflected in the mechanics of
enforcement. Whereas interpersonal fiduciary accountability is
primarily achieved by beneficiaries acting personally on private
rights of action, institutional fiduciary accountability is realized
rights can be held by persons other than the holder of the right, and likewise an individual
may be granted standing to enforce fiduciary duties attaching to a governance mandate
without doing so on the basis of a personal claim right in respect of the mandate. Cf. Leib et
al., supra note 79, at 394 (noting that “there is not necessarily a one-to-one correlation be-
tween standing to sue and to whom a duty is owed”). On the distinction between directed and
non-directed duties in general, see generally DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984);
Michael Thompson, What Is it to Wrong Someone? A Puzzle About Justice, in REASON AND
VALUE: THEMES FROM THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH RAZ 331, 350-51 (R. J. Wallace et
al. eds., 2004); and Gopal Sreenivasan, Duties and Their Direction, 120 ETHICS 465, 467-68
(2010).
123. Likewise, there is no individual with the special standing to enforce such a claim right.
On the special standing involved in accountability relationships structured in terms of correl-
ative or bipolar rights and duties, see STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT:
RESPECT, MORALITY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 11-15 (2006); Darwall & Darwall, supra note 98,
at 20.
124. This is so at least under an interest theory of rights; on the nature of claim rights in
general, see Leif Wenar, The Nature of Claim-Rights, 123 ETHICS 202, 207 (2013); Leif Wenar,
The Nature of Rights, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223, 229 (2005); and Gopal Sreenivasan, A Hybrid
Theory of Claim-Rights, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 257-58 (2005).
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differently.125 As noted earlier, various legal actors may enjoy
monitoring and enforcement powers relative to governance man-
dates. Those powers may be exercised in different ways depending
on who has the power and how it arises. In some cases, enforcement
powers may be wielded through a private right of action or a
derivative action for a personified entity. Alternatively or addition-
ally, when enforcement powers are held by public officials or gov-
ernment agencies, accountability may be achieved through direct
administrative or regulatory action. 
III. FIDUCIARY LOYALTY TO PURPOSES
To this point, in considering the implications of fiduciary gov-
ernance for fiduciary liability, we have focused primarily on
structural matters. We have implied, but not yet argued, that the
institutional character of fiduciary liability as it relates to fiduciary
governance is evident in the content of fiduciary duties. In this Part
we aim to make good on this suggestion. In what follows, we can-
vass dominant interpretations of the fiduciary duty of loyalty in
private law, noting that each supposes that loyalty is something
shown to persons. We will then argue that it is possible to be loyal
to abstract purposes and, indeed, that fiduciaries acting under
governance mandates are obligated to be loyal in just this sense.
A. Conceptions of Loyalty to Persons
The fiduciary duty of loyalty has recently attracted significant
academic attention. Most accounts of the duty assume that it is
directed toward a person or persons who enjoy a corresponding
claim right to the fiduciary’s loyalty. There are two leading accounts
of fiduciary loyalty in this sense: proscriptive accounts and prescrip-
tive accounts. Proscriptive accounts focus on the types of conduct
that fiduciaries are prohibited from participating in. Prescriptive
125. On the differences between private and public law remedies in general (and the
promises and pitfalls of private enforcement actions in public law contexts), see Freeman, The
Private Role in Public Governance, supra note 48, at 668-69; Richard B. Stewart & Cass R.
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1206-07 (1982); and
Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432,
1444 (1988).
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accounts, by contrast, suggest that the fiduciary must demonstrate
her loyalty through some affirmative conduct.
As one of us has noted elsewhere, proscriptive accounts of loyalty
tend to focus on two proscriptive rules in particular. These are the
well-known conflict rules:
First is the requirement that the fiduciary avoid conflicts be-
tween pursuit of his self-interest and fulfilment of his duty to act
for the benefit of the beneficiary (the conflict of interest rule).
Second is the requirement that the fiduciary avoid conflicts be-
tween this duty and the pursuit of others’ interests (the conflict
of duty rule).126
In combination, these rules do not require the fiduciary to act in
any particular way but are instead thought to establish boundaries
within which the fiduciary may reasonably be expected to act loyal-
ly, at least to the extent that the rules isolate biasing factors that
might induce the fiduciary to subjugate the interests of beneficiaries
to the interests of others.127
By contrast, prescriptive accounts suggest that compliance with
the duty of loyalty calls for a distinctive kind of action on the part
of the fiduciary. In their classic form, prescriptive accounts impli-
cate a requirement of affirmative devotion toward the fiduciary’s
beneficiary.128 Lionel Smith has provided a leading account of loyal-
ty so understood.129 On his view, the motives of the fiduciary are the
crucial element in determining whether the fiduciary has acted loy-
ally, and the requirement of motive is quite specific—the fiduciary
“must act (or not act) in what he perceives to be the best interests of
126. Miller, Theory, supra note 83, at 257. In some jurisdictions, notably in Australia, the
duty of loyalty is considered to be purely proscriptive. See MATTHEW CONAGLEN, FIDUCIARY
LOYALTY: PROTECTING THE DUE PERFORMANCE OF NON-FIDUCIARY DUTIES 62 (2010).
127. See, e.g., Irit Samet, Guarding the Fiduciary’s Conscience—A Justification of a
Stringent Profit-Stripping Rule, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 763, 764-65 (2008) (discussing bias
concerns in fiduciary law); Henry E. Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPH-
ICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 261, 265-68 (discussing opportunism
concerns).
128. See Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 457, 461 (2009); Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in
Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 37-38 (2003).
129. See Lionel Smith, The Motive, Not the Deed, in RATIONALIZING PROPERTY, EQUITY AND
TRUSTS: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EDWARD BURN 53, 67 (Joshua Getzler ed., 2003).
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the beneficiary.”130 This conception of loyalty as pertaining to motive
or subjective purpose is especially prominent in Delaware corporate
law, where the duty of good faith has been incorporated into that of
loyalty. According to the Delaware Supreme Court:
A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance, where
the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that
of advancing the best interests of the corporation ... or where the
fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to
act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties.131
As this language suggests, prescriptive accounts suggest that fi-
duciary loyalty to persons requires more than avoidance of conflicts
or other sources of bias;132 it requires that one take initiative to ben-
efit one’s beneficiary.133
While Lionel Smith’s account is especially prominent, there are
other possibilities for prescriptivism. One could, for example, adopt
an agency model according to which loyalty is tied to obedience or
compliance with the instructions of one’s principal. On this view,
loyalty may be understood as entailing adherence to a beneficiary’s
instructions or present preferences. Alternatively, loyalty may be a
function of the fiduciary’s adherence to a beneficiary’s specified
purposes.
Consider first the idea of being loyal to a person by acting in their
best interests. This conception of loyalty may call for a fiduciary to
act paternalistically. Indeed, Daniel Markovits has argued that
“fiduciary loyalty and care build a measure of paternalism into
130. Id. Whether such loyalty properly counts as a duty or as a requirement for valid fidu-
ciary conduct is a separate question. See Lionel D. Smith, Can We Be Obliged to Be Selfless?,
in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 141, 152; see also Arthur
B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 99, 137-38
(2008).
131. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006) (quoting In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)).
132. While theorists often emphasize either proscriptive or prescriptive standards of loyal-
ty, they may be linked. See, e.g., Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISR. L.
REV. 3, 28 (2000) (“The obligation of disinterestedness cannot be severed from the obligation
to promote and preserve.”).
133. See Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Sharing Ex Post: The Non-Contractual
Basis of Fiduciary Relations, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note
1, at 209, 216 (“A fiduciary must take the initiative on her beneficiary’s behalf.”).
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every fiduciary relation.”134 On this view, a fiduciary should act in
what she believes are the beneficiary’s best interests, even if the
beneficiary might prefer a different course of action.135 A paternalis-
tic form of fiduciary loyalty is arguably prominent in trust law, in
which trustees have independent discretion to make choices that
beneficiaries may disagree with.136 It is also arguably evident in
corporate law, which provides that directors may act contrary to
their shareholders’ known desires when executing their mandate.137
Yet agents are also fiduciaries, and unlike trustees and directors,
their powers are checked by a legal duty of obedience to their
beneficiaries (that is, their principals). On one view, the duty of obe-
dience is separate from that of loyalty.138 But loyalty and obedience
can be intertwined. For example, on a leading account, fiduciary
loyalty serves as a benchmark for the interpretation of ambiguous
instructions by an agent.139 Furthermore, following a principal’s
unambiguous instructions may be described as an element of
loyalty, such that an obedient agent is a loyal agent.140
This latter understanding is consistent with extra-legal usage, in
which following instructions is frequently viewed as an element of
loyalty. It is entirely coherent for the leader of a social group joined
in a common cause to say to members of the group, worried about a
matter delegated to one amongst them: “He is loyal; he will do what
134. Id. at 217.
135. See id. at 216-17.
136. See Tamar Frankel, Watering Down Fiduciary Duties, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 242, 255 (“Agency and trusteeship are very similar
except for the ability of the entrustor-principal to control the fiduciary.”).
137. See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S’holders Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 655 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“Di-
rectors are not thermometers, existing to register the ever-changing sentiments of stock-
holders.”).
138. See Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43,
47-48 (2008).
139. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Fiduciary Character of Agency and the Interpretation of
Instructions, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 321 (“The
agent’s fiduciary duty to the principal furnishes a benchmark for interpretation and for
assessing actions the agent takes in response.”).
140. See Douglas R. Richmond, Yours, Mine, and Ours: Law Firm Property Disputes, 30 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 1, 26 (2009) (“Agents owe a duty of obedience as an aspect of their duty of
loyalty, and they are accordingly bound to follow their principals’ lawful instructions.” (citing
WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 144 (3d ed. 2001))); see also
SIMON KELLER, THE LIMITS OF LOYALTY vii (2007) (“If you are loyal to something, then you
probably favor it, in one way or another, in your actions. You might promote its interests,
treat it with respect or veneration, follow its orders, or act as its advocate.”) (emphasis added).
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he is told.”141 This conception of loyalty is also prominent in political
theory. A loyalty-based theory of political obligation suggests that
individual citizens should comply with their state’s directives out of
loyalty to the state, with loyalty being understood as an expression
of respect for the authority of the state.142 This way of thinking
about political obligation only makes sense if loyalty may involve
compliance with a principal’s instructions or commands.
Importantly for present purposes, a variant on this conception of
loyalty emphasizes purposes. Rather than following a beneficiary’s
instructions as written, or even as intended, one may instead be
loyal to a beneficiary by advancing the purposes underlying the
beneficiary or benefactor’s directives. This conception of loyalty is
relevant to the well-known purposivist approach to statutory inter-
pretation.143 According to this approach, judges should aim to give
effect to the purposes underlying a statute when they interpret it.144
Doing so is said to be a way of proving oneself a faithful agent of the
legislature.145 On this view of agency, the faithful agent may be en-
tirely unconcerned with present preferences, insofar as it is the
purposes of a past legislature that are at stake.146
141. There is also a related possibility: one might be loyal by doing what one is requested
but not ordered to do. We may demonstrate loyalty to a friend, for example, by acting in com-
pliance with that friend’s requests. Cf. DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE
99-100 (2012) (indicating that a friend’s request may create an obligation).
142. On such theories, see JOSEPH RAZ, The Relevance of Coherence, in ETHICS IN THE PUB-
LIC DOMAIN 308-10 (1994).
143. See John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 119-20 (de-
scribing the history of purposivist approaches to statutory interpretation). There is also a
purposivist approach to constitutional interpretation. See generally AHARON BARAK, PUR-
POSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW (Sari Bashi trans., 2007).  A similar point about loyalty ap-
plies in this area as well.
144. See Manning, supra note 143, at 119-20.
145. See id. at 147-48 (describing the faithful agent theory as a core premise of purpos-
ivism in statutory interpretation); Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Against Methodological
Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573, 1582 (2014) (“The leading theories of statutory inter-
pretation tend to accept the view that federal judges should ordinarily serve as faithful agents
of Congress when interpreting federal legislation.”). While there is a close relationship be-
tween complying with intentions and complying with purposes, they are not the same thing.
For example, when it comes to statutory interpretation, purposivists often reject the existence
of a subjective legislative intent. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purpos-
ivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 78 (2006).
146. But cf. EINER ELHAUGE, STATUTORY DEFAULT RULES: HOW TO INTERPRET UNCLEAR
LEGISLATION 9-10 (2008) (suggesting the import of present legislative preferences in cases of
statutory ambiguity).
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Furthermore, it is possible to be loyal to an artificial person, such
as a corporation, by respecting the purposes for which it was es-
tablished. For example, corporate charters sometimes stipulate
corporate purposes. Compliance with purpose clauses can be under-
stood as a type of loyalty.147 Indeed, a corporation’s purposes may
demand loyal adherence even if the director believes that the mater-
ial best interests of the corporation would be better served by an
alternative course of action. 
This conception of loyalty has analogues beyond law. Unlike cor-
porations, natural persons obviously do not have charters or other
formal records of personal purposes; they usually develop a deeply
meaningful set of purposes over time. Appreciation of these pur-
poses and their significance can inform our understanding of what
it means to be loyal to a person. Personal purposes are often formed
through sustained commitments rooted in the development of per-
sonal, family, and cultural identities. During the course of their
lives, individuals develop ground projects that give their lives
meaning.148 As Bernard Williams notes, a person may be “identified
with his actions as flowing from projects and attitudes which in
some cases he takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life
is about.”149 A loyal friend or family member may advance the pur-
poses reflected in a person’s ground projects as a means to be loyal
to that person, even if they fear that pursuit of these purposes will
not advance (or might impair) that person’s objectively-construed
best interests.
As these examples suggest, prescriptive accounts of loyalty to
persons can involve much more than conduct in the best interests
of another. Loyalty may involve obedience to the commands or in-
structions of others, fidelity to their preferences, or allegiance to
their purposes. 
147. See Martin Gelter & Genevieve Helleringer, Constituency Directors and Corporate Fi-
duciary Duties, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 302, 319
(“Directors to a large extent determine via their deliberations the corporate objective—and
thus determine the content of the duty of loyalty—themselves.”).
148. For seminal accounts of ground projects, see J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS,
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 116 (1973), and BERNARD WILLIAMS, Persons, Character
and Morality, in MORAL LUCK 1, 8-10 (1981).
149. See SMART & WILLIAMS, supra note 148, at 116.
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B. Conceptualizing Loyalty to Abstract Purposes
Although there are significant differences among prescriptive ac-
counts of fiduciary loyalty, all characteristically suggest that a
fiduciary’s loyalty is directed toward persons—either their interests,
preferences, or purposes in respect of their own person or that of
others.150 Loyalty, however, need not be directed toward persons. It
may instead be directed toward abstract purposes that transcend
the interests of determinate persons.151
There are suggestive statements to this effect in law and in
scholarship.152 For example, James Penner has pointed out that
trustees’ duty of loyalty to their beneficiaries in conventional do-
native trusts is often conditioned in significant ways by the settlor’s
specification of abstract purposes for the trust; indeed, in many
trusts, beneficiaries’ interests are conditioned on those purposes.153
In circumstances like this, though the fiduciary owes loyalty to
beneficiaries (and therefore to persons), she also owes allegiance to
purposes specified by a benefactor.154 
In our view, loyalty to purposes differs from loyalty to persons in
the specification of the object of the duty of loyalty. Whereas the
object(s) of fiduciary loyalty under service-type mandates are
beneficiaries, the objects of loyalty for governance-type mandates
are the abstract purposes for which a particular mandate has been
established. Generally speaking, a fiduciary will demonstrate
loyalty to the purpose(s) underlying her mandate by exercising her
150. See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text; see also J.E. Penner, Is Loyalty a Virtue,
and Even If it Is, Does it Really Help Explain Fiduciary Liability?, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 159, 161 (“I shall restrict my discussion to
individuals, for they, as objects of loyalty, are most relevant to whether or not the concept of
loyalty illuminates or obscures fiduciary liability.”).
151. More broadly, loyalty may have abstract objects. A classic example from philosophical
literature is 2 JOSIAH ROYCE, The Philosophy of Loyalty, in THE BASIC WRITINGS OF JOSIAH
ROYCE: LOGIC, LOYALTY, AND COMMUNITY 855, 861 (John J. McDermott et al. eds., 2005)
(providing a preliminary definition under which loyalty involves loyalty to a cause). See also
KELLER, supra note 140, at 22 (describing the possibility of loyalty to a principle or an ideal).
152. Fiduciary law also recognizes beneficiaries that are non-abstract but lack legal
personality, including animals. See Frankel, supra note 136, at 245 (“[U]nlike a contract, a
trust relationship may, but need not, involve two parties. A trust can be established for the
benefit of a cat or a dog or an unborn child.”) (footnotes omitted).
153. See J.E. Penner, Purposes and Rights in the Common Law of Trusts, 48 REV. JUR.
THÉMIS U. MONTRÉAL 579, 587-96 (2014).
154. Id. at 584-85.
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discretionary powers exclusively with a mind to advancing those
purposes. In our view, loyalty to purposes can be demonstrated more
concretely in ways that parallel forms of loyalty to persons. Indeed,
the parallel content of the duty may explain why commentators
have failed to notice that fiduciaries are often obligated to act to
advance purposes rather than the interests of persons.155
As is true of fiduciary loyalty to persons, fiduciary loyalty to pur-
poses has proscriptive and prescriptive dimensions. Proscriptive
rules limit the possibility of bias tainting the judgment of the
fiduciary; prescriptive rules ensure that she is faithful to the ob-
jects of her mandate. The proscriptive rules attracted by governance
mandates are identical to those familiar from service mandates
save that they must be modified to reflect the fact that the objects
of governance mandates are purposes. We suggest that the modified
conflict of interest rule requires fiduciaries to avoid situations in
which they have a personal interest that may undermine their
uninhibited pursuit of the purpose(s) underlying their mandate. By
contrast, the modified conflict of duty rule requires fiduciaries to
avoid undertaking a new mandate if their pursuit of the purposes
underlying it may undermine their uninhibited pursuit of the
purposes stipulated for an existing mandate.
It may be noticed that, thus interpreted, the content of the pro-
scriptive rules varies only slightly across service-type and govern-
ance-type relationships. In our view, the existence of a common core
of proscriptive content should be unsurprising because the conflict
rules respond to properties shared by service-type and governance-
type fiduciary relationships; namely, the fact that fiduciaries enjoy
discretion in the exercise of powers. The enjoyment of discretion
entails a risk of biased or corrupted judgment.156 That risk is con-
trolled by the proscriptive rules.
We acknowledge that adaptation has its limits, however. Some
prescriptive standards of loyalty known to apply to service-type
155. For related reasons, a shift from a service mandate to a governance mandate under-
standing need not have a significant impact on a fiduciary’s liability risk, and remedial
doctrines will often be unaffected. The business judgment rule in corporate law, for example,
would be largely identical in its impact, outside of egregious cases in which deliberate viola-
tions are evident. In certain settings—such as when it is clear that a prescriptive duty is being
violated—differences in content will produce divergent case outcomes, but in many settings
both types of fiduciary mandate will operate in similar ways.
156. See generally Smith & Lee, supra note 85.
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mandates could not easily be adapted for application to governance-
type mandates. For example, best-interests standards of loyalty
have no direct corollary in a governance context because they make
essential reference to the interests of persons. Similarly, fairness
standards as they are conventionally understood could not be ap-
plied to the administration of a governance-type mandate to the
extent that interests in fair treatment are bound up in the moral
personality of natural persons. Fairness standards, as they apply in
service-type contexts, enjoin fiduciaries from discriminating be-
tween multiple beneficiaries with equal interests in a mandate. It
is difficult to see how a standard like this, which references the legal
interests of persons, could be transposed to a governance context.
The parallel situation in fiduciary governance is one in which a
fiduciary is called upon to pursue multiple, non-prioritized purposes.
While fiduciaries in these contexts are evidently required to balance
the purposes for which they act, it would be odd to suggest that in
striking a balance between purposes they are enjoined to show
fairness to the purposes by refraining from discriminating between
them.
Nevertheless, the underlying idea that a fiduciary should judi-
ciously balance competing claims is clearly one that could support
parallel fiduciary governance norms. In lieu of a best interests
standard, one could, for example, argue that fiduciaries are obliged
to act in a manner that would be most likely to advance the pur-
poses specified for their mandates.157 Similarly, in place of an equal
standing conception of fairness, fiduciaries could be held to stan-
dards of fair dealing, which require that they honestly and forth-
rightly serve the purposes attached to their mandates, and that they
not knowingly prejudice achievement of those purposes by disre-
garding some purposes or favoring conflicting purposes.
 
157. As suggested by Lionel Smith in respect of the administration of charitable purpose
trusts: “[T]rustees of charitable trusts do not have to take account of the best interests of any
person or persons in order to act loyally; they must take account of the best way to achieve
a purpose.” Lionel Smith, Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of Judgement
on Behalf Another, 130 L.Q. REV. 608, 611 (2014).
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IV. THE IDEA OF FIDUCIARY GOVERNANCE: INTERPRETIVE
IMPLICATIONS
Governance-type fiduciary mandates are distinguished from
service-type mandates on the basis that their objects are defined
purely in terms of abstract purposes, without reference to the inter-
ests of determinate persons. Fiduciaries who act under governance-
type mandates are subject to standalone fiduciary duties that
ensure a form of fidelity to purpose. In what follows, we will identify
key interpretive implications of our account of fiduciary governance
for public and private fiduciary law. As will soon become evident,
our account offers new perspectives on a wide variety of important
issues, ranging from our conception of the relationship between
public officials and members of the public under fiduciary theories
of government to our understanding of the role of religious and
other non-commercial purposes in the governance of corporations. 
A. Public Fiduciary Law
The idea that the state and its officials occupy a fiduciary role is
longstanding,158 and can be traced to the writings of the ancient
Greeks and Romans.159 Hugo Grotius’s work suggests that the asser-
tion of sovereignty by states is premised on fiduciary principles.160
And the English philosopher John Locke argued that legislative
power is “a fiduciary power to act for certain ends.”161 In the United
158. This brief historical account of origins of the idea of fiduciary government draws on
the careful historical and exegetical work of Evan Criddle. See Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary
Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV.
441, 466-68 (2010).
159. See CICERO, DE OFFICIIS bk. I, ch. XXV, at 87 (T.E. Page & W.H.D. Rouse eds., Walter
Miller trans., MacMillan & Co. 1913) (c. 44 B.C.E.); PLATO, THE REPUBLIC (Chris Emlyn-Jones
& William Preddy trans., 2013); see also Robert G. Natelson, The Constitution and the Public
Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1097-1101 (interpreting Plato and Cicero in fiduciary terms).
160. See Evan J. Criddle, A Sacred Trust of Civilization: Fiduciary Foundations of In-
ternational Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 404,
413 (citing HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM ch. V (Ralph Van Deman Magoffin trans., 1916)
(1608); HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS bk. II, ch. 2 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925)
(1625)).
161. JOHN LOCKE, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Gov-
ernment (1690), in SOCIAL CONTRACT 3, 87 (Sir Ernest Barker ed., 1947).
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States, a fiduciary conception of government was prominent in the
nation’s founding.162 The idea of fiduciary government is not just of
historical interest, however. Recently, public fiduciary theory has
experienced a resurgence as seen in the development of important
new accounts of the implications of fiduciary principles for our
understanding of the state,163 Congress,164 the judicial branch,165 and
administrative agencies.166
Public fiduciary theorists commonly base their analyses on anal-
ogies between public institutions and private law counterparts,
drawing most notably on exemplars of fiduciary relationships found
in trust law,167 corporate law,168 partnership law,169 and agency
law.170 In analogizing from private to public law, these scholars as-
sume that all fiduciary relationships are similarly constituted and
thus that the distinctive characteristics of service-type relation-
ships must have corollaries in public law fiduciary relationships. 
This Section will begin with a review of areas in which the idea
of fiduciary governance can help us to better understand the appli-
cation of fiduciary principles to public law. As we will see, certain
features of public law institutions generate problems for public
fiduciary theory because theorists work from the perspective of
service-type fiduciary relationships. Appreciation of the distinctive-
ness of fiduciary governance and its role in government promises
better reconciliation of theory and institutional reality.
162. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 294 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1895); THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF JOHN ADAMS 28 (C. Bradley Thompson ed., 2000).
163. See, e.g., FOX-DECENT, supra note 22, at 34.
164. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temptation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading
and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 845, 852 (2013); Donna M.
Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment, 91 B.U. L. REV.
1105, 1111 (2011) [hereinafter Nagy, Insider Trading]; Donna M. Nagy, Owning Stock While
Making Law: An Agency Problem and a Fiduciary Solution, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 567, 568
(2013); D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 676-77 (2013).
165. See, e.g., Ethan J. Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 699,
701 (2013).
166. See, e.g., Criddle, supra note 97, at 120; Evan J. Criddle, Mending Holes in the Rule
of (Administrative) Law, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (2010).
167. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 164, at 872.
168. See, e.g., id. at 888; Rave, supra note 164, at 723-24.
169. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 164, at 885.
170. See, e.g., Leib et al., supra note 165, at 727.
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1. The Judicial Branch
The application of fiduciary principles to judges may seem
counterintuitive given the importance of impartiality in judging.
Courts sometimes recognize that judges are fiduciaries in limited
circumstances. For example, Judge Richard Posner has noted: “We
and other courts have gone so far as to term the district judge in the
settlement phase of a class action suit a fiduciary of the class, who
is subject therefore to the high duty of care that the law requires of
fiduciaries.”171 But the notion that judicial offices are inherently fi-
duciary may not be obvious.
Recently, Ethan Leib, David Ponet, and Michael Serota developed
a sophisticated fiduciary theory of judging.172 As they note, judicial
offices have some of the standard indicia of fiduciary mandates.173
Judges enjoy broad discretionary authority.174 They can be under-
stood to wield power through entrustment.175 And citizens are ob-
viously vulnerable to the judicial exercise of power in the ordinary
course of adjudication.176 Even so, fiduciary theories of judging face
a significant challenge: on the conventional understanding of fidu-
ciary law, one must identify beneficiaries of the particular mandate
borne by the fiduciary.177
Suppose that, in recognition of citizens’ heightened vulnerability
to the exercise of judicial powers, we characterize litigants as the
beneficiaries of judicial offices. This view, while supported to some
extent by analysis of the characteristics of service-type fiduciary
relationships, is difficult to square with the neutrality that society
expects judges to show in adjudication. Impartiality is a virtue in
adjudication, and it is a far cry from the decidedly partial pursuit of
the interests of others that we normally expect of fiduciaries. 
One might respond by substituting another beneficiary for li-
tigants or others whose personal interests are directly affected by
adjudication. One might argue that “the people” in aggregate are
171. Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2002).
172. Leib et al., supra note 165, at 703.
173. Id. at 727.
174. See id. at 718.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 719.
177. See id.
568 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:513
beneficiaries of judicial offices. Indeed, this is the view of Leib,
Ponet, and Serota.178 As they argue:
Hard as it may seem to engage in the fiduciary representation
of a class as large as “the people,” democratic governance calls
for nothing less. To say that judges hold the public’s interest in
trust is more than mere rhetoric or analogy; the people are their
real beneficiaries and judges should conform their conduct to
fiduciary standards.179
While the notion that judges are fiduciaries of the people is in-
tuitively appealing, it is also overly vague. Who constitutes “the
people” remains unclear. “The people” could include the people in
the state, district, or circuit over which a judge has jurisdiction; it
could include all American citizens; it might include non-citizens in
cases that implicate their interests; it might even include future
generations.180 A further problem concerns the type of reasoning
involved in decisions that aim at the best interests of the public.
Such reasoning must inevitably be concerned with prospective out-
comes, but it is questionable whether this type of reasoning is
consistent with the internal point of view on adjudication.181 Private
law adjudication is famously retrospective, with courts seeking a
just resolution of a dispute between litigants that is rooted in their
past interactions.182 Judges only occasionally focus on prospective
issues and in doing so ordinarily focus on issues of interpersonal
accountability (for example, in enjoining future harmful wrongdo-
ing) rather than on incentives or socially just distributions.183 
178. See id. at 721.
179. Id.
180. This mapping problem is one that Leib, Ponet, and Serota have discussed at length
in their work. See infra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
181. The difficulty is in squaring this account with the way in which courts describe their
reasoning in judicial opinions. In other words, it is difficult to accept the forward-looking
account of judicial reasoning if we adopt a transparency criterion for the interpretation of
private law doctrine. For a discussion of transparency criteria and their relevance, see
STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 24-32 (2004).
182. See JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 16-18 (2001); Gold, supra note 98,
at 1885-86 (2011); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 LEGAL THEORY 457, 462
(2000).
183. This is a point on which there is some agreement amongst civil recourse and corrective
justice accounts of private law. For leading corrective justice accounts, see JULES L. COLEMAN,
RISKS AND WRONGS 303-24 (1992), and WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW, supra note 98, at
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In addition, engaging in conduct with the object of benefitting a
person differs significantly from engaging in conduct that predict-
ably benefits a person. When a trustee for a charitable trust acts to
advance the trust’s purposes, doubtless her success will redound to
the benefit of the public. It does not follow that the public is a bene-
ficiary of the trust. The trustee’s mandate is defined by the purposes
established for the trust, and she owes her fidelity to those purposes
rather than to any person or group of persons who hope to benefit
from their fulfillment. The same is true of judges. Judicial offices
are established for the benefit of the public, and their proper exer-
cise predictably yields public benefits, but it does not follow that the
public is a beneficiary of judicial offices in a formal legal sense.184
An alternative would view judicial mandates as enjoyed by dele-
gation, in which case judges may be considered fiduciaries of some
other organ of the state, or of the state itself (which, in turn, is a
fiduciary of the public). Thus one might argue that judges should be
considered agents of the legislature. After all, a standard view of
statutory interpretation requires judges to serve as “faithful agents”
in enforcing statutes as written, as intended by the legislature, or
in a manner consistent with legislative purposes.185 This view of
judicial power as enjoyed on the basis of delegation may be accurate
in some settings. The difficulty is that this view is not generalizable;
in many cases, adjudication does not involve, much less turn on,
statutory interpretation or analogous functions. 
Some describe judging as a fiduciary enterprise without referring
to beneficiaries as such.186 For example, according to Sarah Cravens:
“It is the judge’s duty, as a trustee, to maintain the integrity of the
corpus of the common law, and the way to do that is to exercise
judicial virtue.”187 Cravens appears to conceive of the judge as a
62-63 (1995). For leading civil recourse accounts, see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse,
Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 714-18 (2003), and Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note
103, at 919.
184. This is also made clear in the public benefit corporation statute, discussed below. See
infra notes 232-37, and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 145 (discussing this theory).
186. See Sarah M.R. Cravens, Judges as Trustees: A Duty to Account and an Opportunity
for Virtue, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1637, 1645 (2005).
187. Id.
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fiduciary of law or legality.188 Leib, Ponet, and Serota reject this
view, arguing as follows:
[I]n contrast to those commentators who consider judges “trust-
ees” for the “corpus of the common law” ... our argument ties
judges’ fiduciary status to those actual citizens who have au-
thorized and delegated power (expressly or not) to them. In other
words, in searching out the relevant beneficiary, one should look
to an actual relationship. The fiduciary principle is, as we have
explained, a rubric for those in relationships of power and
vulnerability; for that reason, the “corpus” is an insufficiently
relational conception of the relevant beneficiary.189
This is a forceful argument, and it would be compelling if fiduciary
relationships consisted only of the service-type. Yet, because fiduci-
aries need not have beneficiaries, one cannot dismiss Cravens’s
account so easily. Indeed, one of the benefits of the idea of fiduciary
governance is that it redirects our attention to the inherently ab-
stract public purpose(s) that underlie the creation and execution of
public offices. One could argue that judges are fiduciaries with a
mandate to serve purposes essential to our shared aspirations to
conditions of legality and justice—purposes which, amongst other
things, require judges to maintain the integrity of the common law.
The problem of identifying beneficiaries of judicial offices then falls
away and is replaced by the more tractable, and arguably more
interesting, challenge of determining what abstract public purposes
may be ascribed to judging.
2. The Executive Branch
The executive branch can also be analyzed through a fiduciary
lens. For example, Evan Criddle has offered an influential account
of the application of fiduciary principles to administrative law.190
On this view, agencies are “stewards for the people,” and “[t]he
terms of an administrative agency’s enabling statute reflect the
type and degree of trust that the people, through their elected
188. See id.
189. Leib et al., supra note 165, at 720.
190. See Criddle, supra note 158, at 448; Criddle, supra note 97, at 120.
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representatives, have chosen to repose in the agency.”191 A key
feature in this account is the broad scope of an agency’s discretion
in carrying out its assigned responsibilities.
On Criddle’s view, the ultimate beneficiary of an agency is the
nation’s populace, subject to the interpolation of a governmental
intermediary—Congress—which, as delegator of power to agencies,
stands between them and the people.192 As is well known, agencies
are supposed to respect congressional intent, and the nature of the
agency’s role depends on the terms of its delegation. In some cases,
the delegation is sufficiently broad that it gives the agency signifi-
cant discretion over how to carry out its mandate.
Consider one of Criddle’s examples: the Federal Trade Commis-
sion. As he notes:
The Federal Trade Commission Act, for instance, authorizes the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to take steps to curb “unfair
methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices,” but provides strikingly little guidance regarding what
competitive strategies would qualify as “unfair” or “deceptive.”
Such broadly phrased standards give agencies enormous flexibil-
ity to craft regulatory regimes responsive to legislative policies
in complex or changing circumstances.193
The FTC does not simply follow legislative instructions; it interprets
its mandate in light of legislative policy, as the circumstances
require. According to Criddle, when a congressional statute is too
vague to discern legislative intent as to the ends of agency discre-
tion, an agency must look to “the broader public interest”194 or to the
interests of the segment of the population that Congress designed
the agency to aid.195 He explains that “[a]s fiduciaries for the people
191. See Criddle, supra note 97, at 136.
192. See id. at 177-78.
193. Id. at 137 (footnote omitted).
194. See id. at 138 (“Where legislative directives leave gaps for agencies to fill or speak in
terms so broad as to ‘give little hint of the congressional intent to which the agency must be
faithful,’ agencies look beyond Congress’s specific intent to the broader public interest.”
(quoting Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 590
(1985))).
195. See id. at 137-38 (“Courts have come to recognize over time that agencies must not
only satisfy the strict terms of their statutory mandates ... and investigate public preferences
... but also assume responsibility as fiduciaries for the broader interests of their statutory
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as a whole, administrative agencies’ fiduciary obligations do not run
solely to the chief executive or the legislature per se, but rather to
the agencies’ statutory beneficiaries, who are often, but not always,
the sovereign people as a whole.”196 
In analyzing the legal character of the mandates undertaken by
administrative agencies, Criddle describes a fiduciary relationship
that implicates beneficiaries.197 Yet if we look closely at his account
of agency responsibilities, it is more suggestive of fiduciary gov-
ernance than fiduciary service. Criddle quotes Judge Merrick
Garland:
[T]he courts have turned ... to an expanded notion of fidelity, one
that requires not only that the agencies not exceed their con-
gressionally authorized powers, but also that they use those
powers as Congress intended. In short, the courts have reached
back to the oldest of administrative law values—maintaining
agency constancy to congressional purpose—in order to extend
protection to a new class of legislative beneficiaries.198
This model requires agencies to advance their legislated purpose(s)
when acting on their mandates. It is, of course, possible that Con-
gress will frame legislated purposes in a manner typical of the
stipulation of purposes in service-type relationships, in which the
fiduciary is granted powers to advance purposes defined in terms of
the interests of determinate persons. But, in general, Criddle’s
account characterizes agencies as having mandates that call for a
balancing of interests in pursuit of a general purpose or set of pur-
poses.
Here, too, we find that features of public administration best lend
themselves to explanation in terms of fiduciary governance. As was
true of judges, in analyzing administrative agencies one may realize
greater return in focusing on the fiduciary nature of the abstract
purposes that animate agencies than one garners in focusing pri-
marily on the interests of persons subject to agency decision mak-
ing. This is not to say that agencies acting as faithful fiduciaries can
beneficiaries.”).
196. See id. at 139.
197. See id. at 126.
198. Id. at 138 (quoting Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 505, 512 (1985)) (emphasis added and omitted).
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safely ignore the interests of persons affected by their decisions;199
it is, rather, to suggest that the fiduciary nature of the mandate
occupied by an agency and its officials is often a function of legis-
lated purposes rather than the delegation of power to advance
interests of determinate persons. 
3. The Legislative Branch
Congress has also recently been theorized in fiduciary terms.
Fiduciary accounts of the legislative branch often center on the
problem of conflicts of interest,200 as fiduciary law provides sophisti-
cated mechanisms to address agency problems that arise in legis-
lative settings. Recent scholarship has, however, been bedeviled by
difficulties in identifying the proper beneficiaries of legislative
bodies.
One prominent strand of scholarship focuses on insider trading.
Donna Nagy and Sung Hui Kim have independently developed
arguments for insider trading liability for members of Congress or
state legislators.201 The relevant statutory provision—Section 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act202—implicates disclosure of inside
information by fiduciaries to their beneficiaries.203 Nagy and Kim
199. For example, they cannot arbitrarily disregard the interests of persons affected by
their decisions. On Criddle’s view, the requirement of advertence to the interests of persons
affected by administrative discretion is suggestive of a fiduciary relationship with, and duty
toward, such persons. We view this requirement as an entailment of the broader mandate
that agencies have to exercise discretion properly in pursuit of broad public purposes.
However, we acknowledge that administrative law at times refers to persons affected by the
decisions of administrative agencies as “beneficiaries” (for example, under the rubric of the
zone of interests test for standing). It is possible that, in some circumstances, the mandates
of administrative agencies are hybrid in nature with fiduciary service and fiduciary
governance elements. The extent of hybridity is a question worthy of further exploration. We
are grateful to Evan Criddle for bringing these points to our attention.
200. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 164, at 908; Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 164, at 1133;
Rave, supra note 164, at 676.
201. See Kim, supra note 164, at 850; Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 164, at 1111.
202. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)); see also SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2011).
203. For the classical theory, see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980).
For the misappropriation theory, see United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
574 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:513
argue for legislator liability on fiduciary principles, on the basis that
legislators are fiduciaries to the public or to the legislature.204
Another important application of fiduciary theory focuses on
election law. Theodore Rave’s recent work on gerrymandering offers
an analysis of redistricting policy in terms of fiduciary proscriptions
on conflicts of interest.205 Legislators have a significant conflict of in-
terest when they draw the districts in which they hope to be
elected.206 Building on analogies to agency cost problems in corpo-
rate law, Rave argues that a fiduciary duty of loyalty should apply
to redistricting.207 
In some cases it may be possible to set aside the question of
whether there are identifiable beneficiaries of legislators and leg-
islative bodies.208 But if fiduciary theories of legislative offices and
action are to apply more widely, it is necessary to confront the issue.
Leib, Ponet, and Serota describe this as a “mapping” problem.209 To
illustrate its difficulty, they give the example of Jane, a state-level
legislator who has sworn to uphold the Constitution of the State of
New Jersey.210 To whom is she a fiduciary? Jane may be a fiduciary
for her constituents. After all, they elected her. However, Jane
might instead be a fiduciary for the citizens of her entire state.211
Leib, Ponet, and Serota add that “Jane may also have at least two
other beneficiaries: the nation’s citizenry and future generations.”212
Each of these latter possibilities is supported by the recognition that
Jane’s conduct in office implicates interests of a public that extend
beyond her present constituents. 
204. For accounts identifying the beneficiary as the public or a subset of the public, see
Kim, supra note 164, at 871-80, and Nagy, Insider Trading, supra note 164, at 1141. For the
theory that legislators owe a fiduciary duty to the legislature, see Kim, supra note 164, at 880-
87.
205. See Rave, supra note 164, at 676.
206. See id. at 677-79.
207. See id. at 708-13.
208. To the extent one focuses entirely on the avoidance of conflicts of interest, it may not
always be necessary to determine the identity of a beneficiary. Cf. Ribstein, supra note 87, at
909 (“The fiduciary duty to avoid self-dealing is not defined with reference to the specific
parties on whose behalf the fiduciary must act.”).
209. See Lieb et al., supra note 79, at 398.
210. See id. at 398-99.
211. See id. at 399.
212. Id. at 400.
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In analyzing these different ways of conceptualizing the fiduciary
nature of legislative offices and activities, Leib, Ponet, and Serota
argue that “it is only through identifying the relevant fiduciary and
beneficiary that one is able to determine the precise contours of the
fiduciary framework’s ethical architecture.”213 On this point, we
disagree. One need not identify a beneficiary to analyze a relation-
ship or office in fiduciary terms; as we have shown, governance-type
mandates have no determinate beneficiaries.214 Adopting a gover-
nance perspective, one might argue that legislators are fiduciaries
for particular abstract purposes.
The mapping problem does not disappear when we adopt a fiduci-
ary governance perspective, but its significance changes. As noted,
we must recognize the possibility of fiduciary duties that are not
owed to particular beneficiaries but are instead framed in terms of
the pursuit of specified abstract purposes.215 If, for example, a legis-
lator can legitimately consider environmental protection as an end
of legislative action, she may advance a purpose defined in terms of
broad considerations of public policy rather than in terms of the
interests of a determinate beneficiary. Quite probably, her constitu-
ents and the citizenry at large will benefit indirectly from good
environmental policy, but enjoyment of such benefits is a contingent
matter—it is not a matter of right.
In our view, debate over the fiduciary character of legislative of-
fices and institutions would benefit from reinterpretation in terms
of fiduciary governance. The focus of debate ought not to be solely
on identifying who should be considered first in line to benefit from
the actions of legislators but also on the fiduciary character of pur-
poses pursued by legislators and legislative bodies, the source(s) of
those purposes and processes through which they are defined and
varied, and the ways in which legislators can or should be held ac-
countable on the basis of their fidelity to the public purposes with
which they have been entrusted.
213. Id. at 389.
214. See supra Part I.B.
215. See supra Part I.B.
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4. The State
Others have argued that the state itself is a fiduciary. Evan Fox-
Decent has provided the most detailed exposition of this view.216
According to Fox-Decent, fiduciary relationships have the following
basic features: 
(1) the fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some discretion or
power; (2) the fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or
discretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical
interests; and (3) the beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at
the mercy of the fiduciary holding discretion or power.217
From this starting point, Fox-Decent explains that the state is a
fiduciary in that it necessarily asserts the legal authority to govern
over its subjects and, by extension, exercises a wide variety of legal
powers.218 Subjects are vulnerable in a twofold sense: First, subjects
are inherently incapable of personally exercising most of the powers
wielded by the state, and second, by virtue of their liability to state
action and duty to obey the state’s lawful commands, subjects are
inherently “subject to” the state and its officials.219
Fox-Decent’s account is powerful and evocative. Yet it faces chal-
lenges, doctrinal and otherwise. As Fox-Decent acknowledges, the
entire project of theorizing state authority in fiduciary terms “may
seem especially implausible to private lawyers accustomed to view-
ing the fiduciary duty as exclusively a duty of loyalty to a particular
beneficiary.”220 The implausibility lies in the thought that fiduciary
loyalty entails partiality to a person and her interests.221 This
conception of fiduciary loyalty is evidently inconsistent with the
duty of the state to impartially balance the interests of different
constituencies.222 One response to this concern is to point to private
fiduciary mandates for the benefit of multiple beneficiaries.223 As
216. See FOX-DECENT, supra note 22, at 29-30.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. Id. at 34.
221. See id.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 35.
2015] FIDUCIARY GOVERNANCE 577
Fox-Decent rightly points out, private fiduciaries are regularly pre-
sented with this conundrum and the response in law is not to deny
the applicability of fiduciary principles.224 Instead, on his view, in
these contexts “the discrete fiduciary duty of loyalty is necessarily
transformed into duties of fairness and reasonableness in private
law cases with multiple beneficiaries whose interests conflict.”225
Fox-Decent is right to criticize private lawyers for “viewing the
fiduciary duty as exclusively a duty of loyalty to a particular ben-
eficiary.”226 However, his analysis assumes the necessity of estab-
lishing the existence of a service-type fiduciary relationship between
the state and its people.227 This, in turn, is problematic. The state is
classically understood to have a responsibility to advance the public
welfare. While there are circumstances in which the state under-
takes fiduciary service mandates—for example, when it administers
a conventional trust or estate for a deceased person228—the
overarching governance functions of the state do not readily align
with the features of service-type fiduciary relationships. In our view,
224. Id. at 34-35.
225. Id. For further discussion, see generally Andrew S. Gold, Reflections on the State as
Fiduciary, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 655 (2013). On the significance of multiple beneficiaries with
conflicting interests in private law contexts, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Fiduciaries with Con-
flicting Obligations, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1867 (2010).
226. FOX-DECENT, supra note 22, at 34.
227. See id. at 3 (adopting a view of the state as owing directed fiduciary duties to the
people as beneficiaries: “[T]he state is a fiduciary of the people over whom it exercises power.
As a fiduciary, the state owes its people a single but complex legal obligation, one which arises
solely from the fiduciary character of its relationship to the people. The state must govern its
people in accordance with the demands of legality”); see also id. at 20 (speaking of the state-
subject relationship as one “mediated and based on trust”); id. at 28 (asserting that “an
overarching fiduciary relationship exists between the state and each person subject to its
authority”); id. at 40 (stating that “the fiduciary relationship, at its most abstract level, is
between the state and each person subject to its power and authority” and noting that the
“fiduciary and relational conception explains why anyone subject to legal authority, regardless
of status, is an equal co-beneficiary of the rule of law”); id. at 41 (explaining fiduciary duties
in public law as directed duties that give rise to correlative claim rights in the people as bene-
ficiaries: “The approach I advocate pays equal attention to the beneficiary’s right and the
fiduciary’s duty, and conceives of them as correlative to each other”; explaining fiduciary
duties in terms of the protection they provide for beneficiaries’ interests and the integrity of
her personality: “the fiduciary principle authorizes the fiduciary to exercise power on the
beneficiary’s behalf, but subject to strict limitations arising from the beneficiary’s worth as
a person subject to fiduciary power”).
228. See United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2323 (2011) (discussing
contexts in which funds are held in trust by the U.S. government for Native American tribes).
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fiduciary theories of the state should include analysis in terms of
fiduciary governance.229
Analyzing the state in these terms would enable fiduciary theor-
ists to better distinguish their own views from those of social con-
tract theorists. It would also permit them to explain the significance
of public policy development and the importance of process in iden-
tifying policy priorities, provide principled criteria for arbitrating
contested claims about public purposes, and make a distinctive
contribution to the debate over the privatization of public functions.
Beyond opening up promising new avenues of inquiry, the idea of
fiduciary governance provides theorists with a ready answer to
private lawyers skeptical about public law applications of fiduciary
principles. The state’s obligation of impartiality is fully consistent
with the fiduciary character of state authority precisely because the
authority of the state is encumbered by public purposes that
transcend the interests of determinate persons. 
B. Private Fiduciary Law
As indicated above, a classic case of fiduciary governance is found
in the administration of charitable purpose trusts. Fiduciary gover-
nance goes to the core of the charitable purpose trust as a kind of
legal institution. A similar analysis could be made of other charita-
ble entities, including non-profit corporations. Museums and educa-
tional institutions also raise a variety of important governance
questions. Furthermore, these examples are not outliers in private
law: entities with charitable or public-regarding purposes occupy a
major place in developed economies.
This Section will consider other, less obvious examples of private
fiduciary governance. While governance mandates exist in other
areas, our focus will be on the law of corporations. We will begin by
analyzing the public benefit corporation. The public benefit
229. Note also that public fiduciary theorists have made reference to the idea of loyalty to
purposes. See FOX-DECENT, supra note 22, at 37 (“On this account, the most fundamental and
general fiduciary duty is not loyalty to an individual or a discrete class of beneficiaries, but
fidelity to the other-regarding purposes for which fiduciary power is held.”). There is, however,
an important difference between purposes that ground duties of loyalty owed to determinate
beneficiaries, and abstract purposes that govern fiduciary conduct even in the absence of
determinate beneficiaries.
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corporation offers a particularly interesting variant on fiduciary
governance inasmuch as it features mixed purposes, combining
pursuit of business objects with charitable purposes. We will then
consider the traditional for-profit corporation, suggesting ways in
which our account sheds new light on important questions of cor-
porate law theory.
1. Public Benefit Corporations
Public benefit corporations are a new kind of business entity that
has recently gained significant attention.230 Public benefit corpora-
tions also present significant puzzles for fiduciary theorists. On the
one hand, shareholders in these for-profit corporations are consid-
ered beneficiaries of the board’s fiduciary duties.231 On the other
hand, shareholders’ interests in pursuit of profit are checked by
corporate commitments to pursue public benefits.232 How can the
specification of mixed and potentially conflicting purposes be made
consistent with traditional ideals of loyal fiduciary administration?
Without distorting the character of the public benefit corporation,
this cannot readily be done. These corporations occupy a middle
ground between a non-profit entity and the classic for-profit cor-
poration.
Consider the text of section 365 of the Delaware General Corpora-
tion Law,233 which makes it clear that the administration of public
benefit corporations entails fiduciary obligations to two parties. The
directors, per section 365(b), are described as having “fiduciary du-
ties to stockholders and the corporation.”234 Section 365(b) is quite
explicit in specifying that those interested in receipt of the public
benefits identified in the corporation’s charter are not beneficiaries
230. For recent analyses of public benefit corporations, see generally J. Haskell Murray,
Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes,
2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90
Days Out: Who’s Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247 (2014); and Kyle Westaway & Dirk
Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An Economic Analysis with Recommendations to Courts,
Boards, and Legislatures, 62 EMORY L.J. 999 (2013).
231. See Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 230, at 1005.
232. See id. at 1034-35.
233. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 365 (2013).
234. See id. (emphasis added).
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in the strict sense of the board’s duties.235 The stockholders and the
corporation are the only identified beneficiaries of the board’s fidu-
ciary duties.236 On the other hand, the language of the provision also
indicates that directors are permitted to balance the pecuniary
interests of the stockholders and corporation against the achieve-
ment of specified public benefits.237
This suggests that the fiduciary administration of public benefit
corporations entails a hybrid mandate involving service and gov-
ernance elements. The board is not merely called on to advance
abstract public purposes. It must also serve the private pecuniary
interests of the corporation and its stockholders. Incorporating a
public purpose into the objects of the corporation alters the charac-
ter of the duty of loyalty owed by its directors. Consistent with the
account we have provided above, the director owes an institutional
form of loyalty to the abstract purposes of the corporation, but his
duty is qualified by the need to consider specific interests of persons
and is structured interpersonally. 
2. Corporate Purpose Clauses and Agency Slack
While opting to incorporate a public benefit corporation is one
way parties may establish a corporation in which directors will be
invested with a governance-type mandate, it is not the only mecha-
nism. Even in jurisdictions that adopt a service-type conception of
the directors’ mandate, there may be circumstances in which fiduci-
ary governance plays a role. Governance-type mandates can be ex-
pressly adopted through corporate purpose clauses.238 Alternatively,
fiduciary governance may be a consequence of agency slack.239
235. See id.
236. Section 365(c) also implicitly recognizes the existence of fiduciary duties of loyalty. See
id. § 365(c) (“The certificate of incorporation of a public benefit corporation may include a
provision that any disinterested failure to satisfy this section shall not, for the purposes of
§ 102(b)(7) or § 145 of this title, constitute an act or omission not in good faith, or a breach of
the duty of loyalty.”).
237. For further analysis of the meaning of these provisions, see Plerhoples, supra note
230, at 257.
238. See Westaway & Sampselle, supra note 230, at 1004.
239. An additional possibility is a for-profit corporation in which directors are tasked with
advancing the interests of shareholders but in doing so are expected to pursue various goals
other than shareholder profit maximization. See Eric Rasmusen, The Goals of the Corporation
Under Shareholder Primacy: Just Profit—Or Social Responsibility and Religious Exercise
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It is well recognized that typical corporate purpose clauses pro-
vide very broad scope for directorial decision making.240 Convention-
al corporate purpose clauses may allow for fiduciary governance
without mandating it. Of course, directors may interpret broad cor-
porate purpose clauses narrowly and act as though they have a
service-type mandate. Nevertheless, the breadth of discretion they
enjoy in determining corporate purposes facilitates fiduciary govern-
ance.
In some states, statutes grant boards discretion to consider a
variety of constituencies when making decisions for the corpora-
tion.241 In many cases, the variety of constituencies and impersonal
factors that boards may consider is quite broad.242 In other jurisdic-
tions, including Delaware, the fiduciary administration of corpora-
tions may formally involve fiduciary service, yet directors may act
on a de facto fiduciary governance model.243 As is well known,
directors have substantial freedom to make decisions in the public
interest. The business judgment rule means that courts will refuse
to second guess directors’ substantive business decisions, barring
conflicts of interest, corporate waste, or egregious procedural
Too? (Jan. 12, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2365135 [http://
perma.cc/N948-LE8E]. This is a service mandate in form, yet it might resemble a governance
mandate in function. Another possibility is that corporations involve hybrid mandates in
which director fiduciary duties involve the advancement of the interests of beneficiaries and
the pursuit of abstract purposes. Furthermore, in some cases, a fiduciary’s pursuit of an
abstract purpose might be constrained by the interests of determinate beneficiaries. We thank
Henry Smith for raising these possibilities.
240. See Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Account of Corporate Illegality
(with Notes on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV.
1279, 1318 (2001) (giving prominent examples of very broad corporate purpose clauses).
Characteristically, such clauses permit any activity for which such corporations may be organ-
ized under state law.
241. For a discussion of the history of these statutes, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theo-
retical and Practical Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L.
REV. 579, 588-90 (1992), and Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate
Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 20-28 (1992).
242. See Orts, supra note 241, at 26-28.
243. See supra notes 233-37 and accompanying text.
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impropriety.244 As Einer Elhauge has noted, directors thus have
significant agency slack.245 
Whether or not the board’s authority is framed in terms sugges-
tive of fiduciary governance, corporations can commit themselves to
purposes that transcend the interests of determinate persons. For
example, a journalistic corporation may structure its affairs in
pursuit of its purpose of providing neutral journalism. Consider
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.246 The board of
directors of Time was interested in a merger with Warner Brothers
but faced a competing offer from Paramount.247 The board placed
great emphasis on the journalistic values of Time, and in particular,
journalistic integrity.248 Partly for this reason, the board rejected the
Paramount offer and made a 51 percent tender offer for Warner.249
The Delaware Supreme Court upheld Time’s plan to merge with
Warner under the business judgment rule and upheld its use of
244. The business judgment rule is often described as “a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and
in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Aronson
v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). For recent analyses of the rule and its significance,
see generally William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care
with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of
Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449 (2002); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Jud-
gment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83 (2004); Andrew S. Gold, A Decision
Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and
Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398 (2007); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psycho-
logical Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571 (1998).
245. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 733, 738-39 (2005). To be clear, we are not claiming that agency slack is equivalent to
a standard of conduct under which directors are required to pursue abstract purposes. The
key point for present purposes is that, even if standards of conduct reflect a fiduciary service
model of directors’ mandates, directors may in practice pursue a governance mandate. On the
significance of standards of conduct in corporate law, see generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62
FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1993), and Julian Velasco, The Role of Aspiration in Corporate Fidu-
ciary Duties, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 519 (2012).
246. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
247. Id. at 1144.
248. See id. “The board’s prevailing belief was that Paramount’s bid posed a threat to
Time’s control of its own destiny and retention of the ‘Time Culture.’” Id. at 1148. “For its
part, Time was assured [under Warner’s terms] of its ability to extend its efforts into
production areas and international markets, all the while maintaining the Time identity and
culture.” Id. at 1148-49; see also id. (indicating the Time board rejected the Paramount offer
in part because, unlike the Paramount offer, the Warner transaction did not threaten Time’s
culture).
249. See id. at 1148.
2015] FIDUCIARY GOVERNANCE 583
defensive measures against Paramount under its decision in Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.250
For present purposes, the interesting feature of the Time case is
the board’s alleged aim of preserving the journalistic identity of the
corporation. Quite possibly, the board felt that this was the best way
to maximize returns for shareholders. It is also possible that self-
interest in entrenchment was a factor. But we need not assume
these motivations. It is equally possible that the board really had
internalized the importance of Time’s journalistic identity and con-
sidered itself bound by abstract purposes that the corporation had
adopted for itself, in which case we have an example of a for-profit
corporation defining and acting on a governance-type or hybrid form
of mandate.
There are other prominent examples of for-profit corporations
adopting abstract purposes and therefore undertaking or introduc-
ing governance-type mandates. For example, for-profit corporations
may commit themselves to religious objectives, a point recently
underscored by the U.S. Supreme Court. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores, Inc., three for-profit corporations, including Hobby Lobby,
challenged the application of regulations under the Patient Pro-
tection and Affordable Care Act, which required certain employers’
health group plans to provide health insurance coverage for con-
traceptives.251 The owners of these corporations objected to being
compelled to pay for coverage of the cost of contraceptives based on
their sincerely held religious beliefs.252 These beliefs were reflected
in statements of corporate purpose for the corporations.253 The Su-
preme Court concluded that the regulations violated the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).254
Questions of corporate law arose in the case because the owners
had decided to operate by means of a for-profit corporation rather
than a sole proprietorship or partnership. The Department of
250. See id. at 1154.
251. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759 (2014).
252. Id.
253. For example, the website of Hobby Lobby Stores describes the mission of the company
in terms that embrace conventional corporate purposes (return on investment) and religious
and charitable purposes (honoring the Lord and investing in families and communities). See
Our Story, HOBBY LOBBY, http://www.hobbylobby.com/about-us/our-story/ [http://perma.cc/
GP4U-FPHS] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015).
254. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785.
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Health and Human Services (HHS) argued that for-profit corporate
status barred the claims.255 The government readily conceded that
non-profit corporations are covered by RFRA, which suggests that
the corporate form itself is not determinative. And precedent made
clear that sole proprietorships are also covered, even if they are for-
profit.256 But the government argued that there is something about
for-profit corporations that distinguishes them from these other
types of entities.257
The majority of the Court found to the contrary. The Court held,
in fact, that modern corporate law rejects the idea that corporations
must exist for the sole purpose of making profits for shareholders258
and emphasized the variability of corporate purposes:
While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit
corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not
require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of
everything else, and many do not do so. For-profit corporations,
with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable
causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to
further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives.259
The Court found that a corporation adopting religious purposes
is entirely consistent with this picture.260 In addition, as the Court’s
language implicitly suggests, the pursuit of corporate purposes need
not involve the advancement of shareholder or stakeholder inter-
ests.261 Corporate purposes will not be considered invalid merely on
the basis that they are not defined in terms of the interests of
determinate persons (beneficiaries).
255. See id. at 2767.
256. See id. at 2770.
257. See id. at 2771.
258. See id. at 2770-72. “Some lower court judges have suggested that RFRA does not
protect for-profit corporations because the purpose of such corporations is simply to make
money. This argument flies in the face of modern corporate law.” Id. at 2770 (footnote
omitted). The Court emphasized that corporations may be created for any lawful purpose. See
id. at 2770-72.
259. See id. at 2771.
260. See id. (“Many examples come readily to mind. So long as its owners agree, a for-profit
corporation may take costly pollution-control and energy-conservation measures that go be-
yond what the law requires.... If for-profit corporations may pursue such worthy objectives,
there is no apparent reason why they may not further religious objectives as well.”).
261. See id. at 2770-71.
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There are a variety of possibilities. Fiduciary governance man-
dates in for-profit corporations may involve the balancing of
constituency interests as contemplated by the team production and
stakeholder theory literature. In some circumstances, corporations
may deliberately undertake purposes that entail a hybrid form of
fiduciary mandate with service and governance elements. Fiduciary
governance may also be a consequence of agency slack. In each case,
fiduciary governance plays a significant, and to this point unrecog-
nized, role in corporate law and corporate behavior.
C. Summary
As the above examples suggest, fiduciary governance spans a
broad range of legal practices. In the case of the state and its public
offices and organs, the idea of fiduciary governance offers a fresh
perspective on challenges faced by public fiduciary theorists. Our
account promises reconciliation of fiduciary theories of government
with aspects of public governance that are not easily squared with
accounts of fiduciary law that assume all fiduciary relationships
feature service-type mandates.
The idea of fiduciary governance, while clearly resonant with
public law and its emphasis on public purposes and interests, is
equally at home in foundational institutions of private fiduciary law.
In trusts, corporations, and other critical legal forms of private
association, fiduciaries may be tasked with the pursuit of abstract
purposes instead of, or in addition to, mandates to advance the in-
terests of determinate persons. Our account of fiduciary governance
promises an improved understanding of the fiduciary administra-
tion of these institutions and of points of commonality between
private and public forms of fiduciary administration. 
CONCLUSION
Fiduciary duties are conventionally thought to be interpersonal
legal obligations generated by relationships between fiduciaries and
beneficiaries. More specifically, they are designed to ensure that
fiduciaries are accountable to beneficiaries for the way in which
they exercise power over beneficiaries’ interests. Yet, much of fi-
duciary law simply cannot be squared with this view. Charitable
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purpose trusts lack determinate beneficiaries, as do corporations
established by the state for public purposes. Moreover, relationships
like this are not outliers. Instead, they occupy a core, if unrecog-
nized, part of the landscape of fiduciary law, encompassing most
public offices and organs of the state and several categories of
private institutions and associations.
Once the phenomenon of fiduciary governance is recognized, a
variety of important implications arise. One set of implications con-
cerns our understanding of fiduciary law proper, including, notably,
the fiduciary duty of loyalty. In the context of governance-type
fiduciary relationships, fiduciary liability and fiduciary duties take
a different, institutional form. The fiduciary is obliged to be loyal,
but the conventional standards by which his loyalty is judged are
reframed in terms of fidelity to purpose. Similarly, the form of the
underlying duty must be understood as a standalone rather than
correlative duty, marking another point at which fiduciary law de-
fies easy categorization.
But perhaps most importantly, the idea of fiduciary governance
has implications for some of the most contentious and difficult
debates in corporate law and political theory. If public corporations
involve governance mandates, then it is no longer apt to query
whether directors owe fiduciary duties to shareholders or even to a
broader set of determinate beneficiaries. Instead, directors may be
better understood as having been granted a governance mandate to
advance abstract corporate purposes. Likewise, if the state itself has
a fiduciary governance mandate, then we need not resolve the vex-
ing question of whether the state must prove loyal to specific con-
stituents, to the citizens as a whole, to non-citizens, and/or to future
generations. The state may instead be governing on the basis of a
complex and intricate set of abstract public purposes, and it must
prove faithful to these purposes. Contentious questions, of course,
still remain to be resolved; we might, for example, wonder how
abstract purposes are to be validly decided upon or how their
content may be settled when disputed. But to our minds, these are
exciting new questions. Our understanding of fiduciary law and its
social significance would be much improved if we pursued questions
like these instead of those that are borne of the assumption that all
fiduciary relationships are of a like kind.
